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1980 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PATRICIA

J. YOUNGBLOOD*

1980 brought considerable attention to one painful episode in
modern international relations: the attack on the United States
Embassy and the holding hostage of United States diplomatic and
military personnel in Iran by militant students, an act ratified by
the government of Iran. The hostage-taking violated one of the
most cherished principles of international law: the inviolability of
diplomatic and consular personnel and premises. The Carter Administration's response to the Embassy attack - the freezing of
Iranian assets within this country, and the agreement between the
United States and Iran that ended the crisis - unfreezing the
assets and barring claims against Iran in United States courts,
spawned significant litigation in 1980 and 1981.
As important and engaging as the hostage crisis was during
1980, it was not the only issue with international overtones confronting state and federal courts that year. The purpose of this article is to survey those cases decided in 1980 by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and federal district courts in New York 1 that involved or impacted upon international law, international relations,
or international commerce. A few of these cases presented what
traditionally have been considered universal principles of international law. Most of the cases raised issues akin to those found in a
survey of domestic law - jurisdictional questions, due process
challenges, choice of law problems - which are appropriate for
discussion in this survey because they arise in the international
arena and thus implicate political and legal values foreign to our
domestic law.
L

THE IRANIAN ASSETS LIT/GA TION2

On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran
• Ass't Prof., Albany Law School of Union University; J.D. Williamette University
College of Law, 1978; L.L.M. Harvard Law School, 1980. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Catherine Gabriels, candidate for J .D., Albany
Law School, 1983.
1. In future years, this Survey will include significant cases involving international
law decided by New York state courts. No such cases were decided in 1980.
2. The Iranian assets litigation discussed below spanned three calendar years,
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was seized and American diplomatic personnel were captured by
militant Iranian students. The seizure of the Embassy and the
holding hostage of the personnel violated customary international
law 3 and numerous treaties to which both the United States and
Iran were signatories. 4
On November 14, 1979, with relations between the United
States and Iran already strained, Iran announced its intention to
withdraw its funds from American banks and their overseas
branches. The same day, President Carter, acting pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA), 5 declared
1979-1981. Because the events that spawned the litigation represented a single and unique
chapter in our political and legal history, the litigation is treated as a whole in the 1980
Survey.
3. See, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(United States of America v. Iran), Judgment of May 24, 1980, [1980] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 42-43. The
Order and Judgment are reprinted at 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 266 (Order), 746 (Judgment) (1980).
4. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, United States-Iran,
Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
and Optional Protocol on Disputes, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
5. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. 1978). The IEEPA is the most recent in a series of
attempts by Congress to define the Executive's power in dealing with international
emergencies. The first modern Congressional effort was the Trading With the Enemy Act
(TWEA) (50 U.S.C. § 95a, currently codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1, app. et seq). TWEA gave the
Executive broad emergency powers but contained no criteria for determining when a national emergency existed. A recent commentator on the Iranian assets litigation noted that
the latitude provided by the Act:
became increasingly apparent as successive Presidents declared "national
emergencies" in all manner of difficult situations, domestic as well as international:
e.g., President Truman, in 1950, declared a national emergency in connection with
the Korean War; President Johnson, in 1968, cited President Truman's declaration
of national emergency as precedent for wideranging measures to correct an ongoing balance of payments deficit; President Nixon, in 1970, invoked section 5(b) as
authority for mobilizing National Guard units during a strike by Post Office
employees and, in 1971, in order to implement a ten percent import duty surcharge.
Gordon, Freeze, Thaw May Squeeze Law: What's Happening to Those Iranian Assets, 12
Int'l Practitioner's Ntbk. 1, 2 (1980).
After the Watergate scandal and the "imperial presidency" of Richard Nixon, Congress passed two bills intended to limit and define the Executive's power in emergencies. First
was the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1605 et seq. (Supp. 1980). It requires
the President to indicate, once he declares a national emergency, the specific provisions of
law under which he proposes to act in dealing with the emergency. 50 U.S.C. § 1631. The
IEEPA, enacted a year later, requires that any emergency declared under the National
Emergencies Act must constitute an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat." 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (Supp. 1980). For an expanded

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss1/5

2

Youngblood: 1980 Survey

1980]

1980 Survey

161

a national emergency and blocked the removal or transfer of "all
property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of
Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States ...." 6 On November 15, 1979, the Treasury Department,
pursuant to presidential authorization, promulgated a regulation
to implement the blocking order. The regulation contained two
critical provisions which would underlie nearly all the subsequent
Iranian assets litigation. First, it provided that "[u]nless licensed
or authorized ... any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is null and void with
respect" to property in which Iran had an interest on or after the
blocking order. 7 Second, the regulation provided that any license
or authorization issued could be "amended, modified, or revoked
at any time." 7a
The President granted a general license on November 26,
1979, authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran but prohibiting the entry of any judgment, decree, or order of similar effect.8 Three weeks later, the Treasury Department issued a clarifying regulation stating "the general authorization for judicial proceedings ... includes pre-judgment attachment." 9
The effect of the President's authorization on the dockets of
federal courts was immediate. In the first months after the
authorization, over 100 lawsuits were filed by companies seeking
attachment of Iranian assets under United States jurisdiction. 10
The claims asserted in these lawsuits were estimated to total over
three billion dollars. 11 By September of 1980, ninety-six civil acanalysis of the IEEPA and the history of Executive emergency powers generally, see, Gordon, The Blocking of Iranian Assets, 14 Int'l L. 659, 662-671 (1980).
6. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979). The specific authority for the
President's order is 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(l)(B) (Supp. II 1978), which empowers the President
to:
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest ....
7. 31 CFR § 535.203(e) (1980) (emphasis added).
7a. 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980).
8. 31 CFR § 535.504(a)(c) (1980).
9. 31 CFR § 535.418 (1980).
10. Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1980, at 18, col. 1.
11. Id.
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tions against Iran or its instrumentalities were pending in the
Southern District of New York alone. 12 It is therefore impossible
to treat all, or even most, of the cases in a survey article. For this
reason, three cases, raising the most common issues in the Iranian
assets litigation,- have been chosen for scrutiny here. The first is
New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 13 which involved Iran's claim of immunity from
prejudgment attachment of its assets. The second is Marschalk v.
Iran National Airlines Corp., et al/ 4 decided by Judge Kevin Duffy
of the Southern District of New York. Third is Dames & Moore v.
Regan,15 recently decided by the United States Supreme Court.
The latter two cases are perfectly suited for a survey article
because, while each opinion is well-reasoned, the District Court
and Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions in resolving
identical legal issues. The reader thus has an opportunity to
understand the competing arguments for and against the power,
statutory and constitutional, of President Carter (and later, President Reagan) to deal with Iranian authorities as he did in the early
and final stages of the hostage crisis.

A.

Initial Challenges: Immunity from Prejudgment
Attachment

The first issue raised in the litigation initiated after President
Carter's issuance of a general license to sue was whether the
State of Iran 16 was entitled to immunity from prejudgment attachment of its assets. In an effort to prevent the removal of Iranian
assets from the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiffs in New
England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power applied for and were
granted orders of attachment. 11 Plaintiffs then moved to confirm
12. Marschalk v. Iran National Airlines Corp., et al., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
13. 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
14. 518 F. Supp. at 69.
15. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972.
16. Throughout the discussion of immunity, any reference to Iran includes not only
the State of Iran but also its agencies and instrumentalities. See, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1980).
17. Plaintiffs in the ninety-six cases filed in the Southern District of New York were
granted orders of attachment pursuant to article 62 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. N.
Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§§ 6201 et seq. (McKinney 1980). Attachment in federal court is available
"under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the
district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 64. Plaintiffs did not seek attachment as a jurisdictional predicate. They relied on 28 U.S.C.
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and defendants moved to vacate these orders. 18 The cases in the
Southern District of New York were consolidated before Judge
Duffy for the sole purpose of determining the immunity question.
Judge Duffy held that defendants could not claim immunity from
prejudgment attachment.
Defendants claimed that, by virtue of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA), 19 their assets were immune from prejudgment attachment. Four separate immunities - jurisdictional
immunity, immunity from prejudgment attachment, immunity
from postjudgment attachment, and immunity from execution
upon a judgment - are covered by the FSIA. Prejudgment immunity is the subject of 28 U.S.C. Section 1610(d), which provides
that the assets of a foreign state (or its agencies and instrumentalities) are immune from attachment before judgment unless such
immunity is explicitly waived by the foreign state. 20 In contrast,
the FSIA provides that waiver of immunity from postjudgment attachment may be either explicit or implicit. 21 The parties agreed
that the only possible source of an explicit waiver of Iran's prejudgment attachment immunity would be the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United
States and Iran. 22 In that treaty, each party expressly waives "immunity ... from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other
liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are

§§ 1330 (a) and 1331 (1980) as a basis of subject matter jurisdiciton and 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (b) as
the basis of personal jurisdiction. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power
Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 123, n.4.
18. Many of the orders of attachment were sought prior to communication with defendants and thus prior to retention of counsel by defendants. These orders were granted ex
parte. Other applications for orders were sought after counsel had been obtained by the
various defendants and were issued only after notice to defendants. The New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules distinguish between these two types of orders. Where an order of
attachment is issued ex parte, the party requesting the order must move to confirm the attachment within five days. N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§ 6211 (b). Where the order is issued upon
notice, the initial burden is on the defendant to move to vacate the attachment. N.Y. C1v.
PRAC. LAW§ 6223 (a). See, New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation
and Transmission Company, 502 F. Supp. 120, 123, n.3.
19. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1602-1611 (1980).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (d) also requires that the purpose of the attachment be to secure a
judgment that may be entered.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (a)(l), (b)(l).
22. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, United States - Iran,
done Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 (effective June 16, 1957).
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subject therein ...." 23 This section clearly does not constitute an
explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment. As the
court noted:
Congress recognized that pre-judgment attachment is an extraordinary and harsh remedy not to be lightly waived. Instead,
only the clearest of waivers will subject a foreign state to this
extraordinary remedy .24

The fact that the Treaty did not explicitly waive immunity
from prejudgment attachment as required by the FSIA did not
end the court's inquiry. The FSIA expressly provides that existing international agreements to which the United States was a
party at the time of the FSIA's enactment would survive. 25 Thus,
"insofar as a foreign state had previously waived its sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, attachment or execution of judgment, by
agreement with the United States, these waivers still control on
the question of immunity ." 26 The court therefore had to resolve a
further question: did Iran implicitly waive immunity from prejudgment attachment in the Treaty? Here the court parted company with at least two other courts faced with the question. 27 In
considering the issue, the court'put great emphasis on the nature
of the remedy involved.
[P]re-judgment attachment, as with the other provisional
remedies, is unique in that it affords plaintiff a substantial
measure of relief absent a final determination that plaintiff is entitled to any relief whatsoever. Moreover, the provisional
remedies are too potentially harassing to be freely granted. For
these reasons, the courts have long adopted the view that "owing to the statutory origin and harsh nature of [these remedies],"
they are to be construed "in accordance with the general rule applicable to statutes in derogation of the common law, strictiy in
favor of those against whom [they] may be employed." 28
23. Id. art. XI, para. 4.
24. 502 F. Supp. 120, 126.
25. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1604, 1609 (1976).
26. 502 F. Supp. 120, 125.
27. See, American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp.
522 (D.D.C. 1980); Behring International v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383
(D.N.J. 1979).
28. 502 F. Supp. 120, 126-127 (quoting Penoyar v. Kelsey, 150 N.Y. 77, 79-80 (1896)).
The court emphasized that as a matter of contractual, rather than statutory, interpretation
the consent to waive immunity must be express and strictly construed (citing United States
v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947)).
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Applying the principle of strict construction, the court could not
conclude that the parties to the Treaty contemplated waiving immunity from prejudgment attachment. 29
Having so ruled, the court then turned to the question
whether the President's actions in response to the hostage crisis
affected Iran's sovereign immunity. The court noted that
sovereign immunity is a privilege granted to foreign governments
as a matter of comity. 30 As "[s]overeign immunity, at the bare
minimum, means that the sovereign may do with its own property
as it wishes," 31 the court concluded that the President's order
blocking transfer of all Iranian property was intended to and did
suspend the sovereign immunity normally granted to Iran, at least
as far as that property was concerned. 32
After issuing his opinion, Judge Duffy, upon request by the
parties, certified the issue of immunity from prejudgment attachment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 33 On January 5, 1981,
the Court of Appeals accepted interlocutory review of the certified question and stayed all proceedings in district courts pending its decision. 34
At approximately the same time the Iranian assets cases
were being filed in federal court in New York, Dames & Moore, a
company whose wholly-owned subsidiary had contracted to render
services for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California against the AEOI, the government of Iran, and a
number of Iranian banks for payments due under the contract. 35
Upon the request of plaintiff, the district court issued orders of
attachment against the property of defendants. 36

B.

The United States-Iran Agreement and Subsequent
Executive Orders
On January 20, 1981, Iran and the United States entered into

29. 502 F. Supp. 120, 127.
30. Id. at 129.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 130.
33. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 508 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
34. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 646 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1981).
35. See, Dames & Moore v. Regan,_ U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2979 (1981).
36. Id.
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an "Agreement" under which the hostages were released. 37 As
part of the Agreement, the United States obligated itself
to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran
and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and
judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation
based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such
claims through binding arbitration. 38

The Agreement also provided that the United States would "act
to bring about" the transfer to Iran by July 19, 1981 of all Iranian
assets held in the domestic branches of American banks. 39 In addition, the Agreement called for the establishment of an Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal which would arbitrate any claim not settled within six months. 40 President Carter sought to implement the
Agreement through a series of Executive Orders. 41 These orders
revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of
"any right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds,
securities, or deposits; "nullified" all non-Iranian interests in
such assets acquired subsequent to the blocking order of
November 14, 1979; and required those banks holding Iranian
assets to transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of
the Treasury ." 42

After taking office, President Reagan ratified these Executive
Orders and "suspended [all] claims except as they may be
presented to the [claims] tribunal." 43
The effect of these orders on New England Nat'l Bank v.
37. The Agreement is embodied in two Declarations: Declaration of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria; Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlements of Claims by the
Governments of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. [Hereinafter cited as "Agreement".)
38. Agreement cited i n _ U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2979-2980 (1981).
39. Agreement cited i n _ U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2980.
40. Id.
41. Executive Orders No's. 12,276-12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-32 (1981).
42. Agreement, quoted at _
U.S. _ , 101 St. Ct. at 2980 (1981).
43. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 42 Fed. Reg. 14111 (1981). The suspension of any such
claim terminates if the Tribunal decides it has no jurisdiction over the claim. When the
Tribunal awards a recovery which is paid or determines that no recovery is due, the claim is
discharged for all purposes. Id.
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Iran Power Generation and Transmission was uncomplicated. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a single question
supplanted the questions that had been certified by Judge Duffy:
"Were the actions of the President in suspending the lawsuits and
nullifying the attachments consistent with constitutional power
and any applicable statutory authority?" 44 The Second Circuit
declined to rule on the question since the issue had not been
presented to or decided by the lower court. Rather, the court
remanded the cases to Judge Duffy with directions to select and
decide one of the pending cases that squarely presented the issue.
The judge was also directed to .join the United States as a party. 45
The Dames & Moore litigation in California took a more complicated path after the Agreement and Executive Orders were
signed. 46 The District Court granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment against two of the defendants in late January.
Plaintiff immediately sought writs of garnishment and execution
in Washington State against Iranian property located in that
state. Concurrently, plaintiff filed a second suit in the California
District Court against the United States and Secretary of the
Treasury, Donald Regan, seeking to prevent the enforcement of
the Executive Orders and Treasury regulations implementing the
Agreement. The District Court denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction, dismissed the claim, stayed the execution
of its earlier summary judgment, and vacated all prejudgment attachments. The day after the appeal from these rulings was
docketed in the Ninth Circuit, the Department of the Treasury
amended its regulations to require the transfer of Iranian financial
assets in the United States to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York by June 19, 1981.47 The District Court then "entered an injunction pending appeal prohibiting the United States from requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to any writ
of attachment, garnishment, judgment, levy, or other judicial lien,
issued by any court in favor of petitioner." 48 The petitioner sought
'
a writ of certiorari
before judgment49 from the United States
44. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power, 646 F.2d 779, 783 (2d Cir.
1981).
45. 646 F .2d 779, 784.
46. The procedural history of Dames & Moore is set out a t _ U.S._, 101 S. Ct.
2972, 2980 (1981).
47. Id. at 2981.
48. Id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (e).
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Supreme Court. The Court granted the petition for writ. 50
The Supreme Court and Judge Duffy were presented with
the same issues but reached opposite results. Although the
Court's decision most likely wholly overruled Judge Duffy's, in the
analysis of the issues that follows, the rationale behind each
court's conclusions will be examined in order that the reader
might understand the competing legal arguments and constitutional values at stake.
Both courts began their consideration of the major issues
presented by the Presidents' actions by reviewing the scope of
presidential power described by Justice Jackson in his concurring
opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 51 Justice
Jackson's concurrence identified three relationships between Congress and the Executive, each of which demands a separate standard of review by the Judiciary in determining the authority of the
President to act in a given case. 52 Recognizing, as Justice Jackson
did, that it represents "a somewhat over-simplified grouping," 53
the Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan paraphrased the
trichotomy:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his powers
but also those delegated by Congress. In such a case the executive action "would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the
burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." When the President acts in the absence of congressional
authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain." In such a case the analysis becomes
more complicated, and the validity of the President's action, at
least so far as separation of powers principles are concerned,
hinges on a consideration of all the circumstances which might
shed light on the views of the Legislative Branch toward such action, including "congressional inertia, indifference or

50. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 3132 (1981). One of the factors probably motivating the
Court to grant the petition was the information conveyed to the Court by the Solicitor
General that if the United States failed to act prior to July 19, 1981, Iran would consider the
United States to be in breach of the Agreement.
51. 343 U.S. 579, 634-655 (1952). (Jackson, J., concurring.)
52. 343 U.S. at 635-638.
53. 343 U.S. at 635.
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quiescence." Finally, when the President acts in contravention of
the will of Congress, "his power is at its lowest ebb," and the
Court can sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress
from acting upon the subject." 54

C.

Did the President Have Statutory or Constitutional Authority
to Nullify the Attachments and Order the Transfer of Iranian
Assets?

1.

DAMES & MOORE V. REGAN

The Supreme Court held that the President had authority
under the IEEP A to issue both the order freezing and the order .
releasing and transferring the Iranian assets. This conclusion was
based on the "plain language" of section 1702 of the IEEPA which
authorizes the President to "nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition ... transfer ... or [exercise of] any right, power or
privilege" with respect to foreign property within the United
States. 55 The Court rejected petitioner's assertion that under section 1702 the President, once having blocked the assets, was empowered only to continue or discontinue the block. 56
Acknowledging that the IEEP A was intended to limit the
President's emergency powers in peacetime under the Trading
With the Enemy Act (TWEA), 57 the Court nonetheless concluded
that these limitations did not affect the authority of the President
to act as he did in regard to the Iranian assets. 58 Because the President's action was taken pursuant to specific congressional
authorization, under Justice Jackson's trifurcated standard of
judicial review, petitioner had a heavy burden to overcome the
strongest of presumptions; 59 a burden, the Court held, petitioner
failed to meet. 60
54. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2981 (1981).
55. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(l)(B) (Supp. 1980); _U.S. _ , 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2982 (1981).
56. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2983 (1981). Accord, Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981); American Int'l Group,
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,_ F.2d _
57. 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 1-44 et seq. (1968 & Supp. 1980), originally codified as 50 U.S.C.
§ 95a (1917).
58. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2983. The Court pointed out that the petitioner proceeded against the blocked assets after the Treasury Department issued licenses authorizing such proceedings. Since the Treasury regulations expressly provided for the amendment, modification or revocation of such licenses, "[p]etitioner was on notice of the contingent nature of its interest in the frozen assets." Id.
59. 343 U.S. 579, 637.
60. _
U.S. _ , 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1981).
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MARSCHALK V. IRAN NAT'L AIRLINES CORP.

While acknowledging that on its face the language of IEEPA
could be read to authorize the President's actions, Judge Duffy
concluded, on the basis of the legislative history of IEEPA, that
the powers conferred by that act do not include nullification of the
rights plaintiff had in the attached Iranian property. 61 Although
Congress did not make clear its purpose in including section 1702,
the exact words of which were drawn from the Trading with the
Enemy Act (TWEA), 62 in the IEEPA, Judge Duffy found
significance in the IEEPA's general purpose, which was to revise
and delimit the President's authority to regulate international
economic transactions during wars or national emergencies. 63
Even more significant was the legislative purpose behind the
TWEA, which was to define, regulate, and punish trading with
the enemy. 64 "Neither the legislative history of the [Trading With
the Enemy Act] nor any case falling under it indicate [sic] a
presidential power to nullify a citizen's court-conferred rights in
foreign property." 65 Thus, in Judge Duffy's view, the President
would have power under the IEEP A to nullify any interest an
American citizen obtained in Iranian property through any transaction with the Iranian owner after the freeze order but not an
interest in Iranian property conveyed by a federal court. 66

D.

Did the President Have Statutory or Constitutional Authority
to Suspend the Cl,aims of American Citizens Pending in
American Courts?

1.

DAMES & MOORE V. REGAN

The Government asserted the President's authority under
the IEEP A and the "Hostages Act," 67 to suspend 68 all claims pend-

61. Marschalk v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
62. 50 U.S.C. § 95a, currently codified as 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 1-44 et seq.
63. 518 F. Supp. at 69, 96.
64. 10 H.R. REP. No. 4960, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., Ch. 106, Pub. L. No. 6591, 40 Stat. 411
(1917) (emphasis added).
65. 518 F. Supp. at 70, 96.
66. Id. at 97.
67. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1979), see note 71, infra.
68. One of the arguments made by the Government throughout the Iranian assets
litigation was that the claims of the various plaintiffs had been suspended rather than terminated. The Agreement between the United States and Iran provided for the termination
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ing in federal courts against the frozen Iranian assets. The Court
concluded that the IEEP A did not authorize the suspension of
claims since "claims of American citizens against Iran are not in
themselves transactions involving Iranian property or efforts to
exercise any rights with respect to such property ." 69 An in personam lawsuit is aimed simply at establishing liability and is not
focused on any particular property in the jurisdiction.70 While
acknowledging that the broad language of the Hostages Act could
be read to cover the President's action, the Court was "reluctant
to conclude" that it gave specific authorization for the suspension
of claims. 71 The legislative history did not suggest an intent on the
part of Congress to cover a situation like the Iranian hostage
crisis. 72
Although the IEEP A and Hostages Act do not specifically
authorize the suspension of claims in American courts, the Court
did not find them "entirely irrelevant to the question of the validity of the President's actions." 73 Rather, they were highly relevant
of legal proceedings. President Reagan, in Executive Order No. 12,294, suspended all
claims. The distinction, while troubling to Judge Duffy, did not affect the resolution of any
issue in either Marschalk or Dames & Moore.
69. _U.S . _ , 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2984-85 (1981).
70. Id. Every court considering this question in Iranian assets litigation has reached a
Similar conclusion. Chas T. Main Int'l, Inc., v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 651
F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, __ F.2d __
n.15; Marschalk v. Iran National Airlines, 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Electronic Data
System v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350, 1363 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
71. __ U.S. __ , 101 S. Ct. at 2985. The Hostages Act provides:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any
foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of
that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be
wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall
forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is
unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the
release, and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.
22 u.s.c. § 1732.
72. ~U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2985.
Although the Iranian hostage-taking violated international law and common decency, the hostages were not seized out of any r~fusal to recognize their American
citizenship- they were seized precisely because of their American citizenship. The
legislative history is also somewhat ambiguous on the question whether Congress
contemplated presidential action such as that involved here or rather simply
reprisals directed against the offending foreign country and its citizens.
Id. See, e.g. CONG. GLOBE 4205, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868).
13. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2986.
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as an indication of "congressional acceptance of a broad scope for
executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this
case." 74 Citing Haig v. Agee,75 the Court noted that, in the areas of
foreign policy and national security, a lack of specific congressional authorization for an executive act does not indicate congressional disapproval of that act. "On the contrary, the enactment of
legislation closely related to the question of the President's
authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to
accord the President broad discretion may be considered to 'invite
measures of independent presidential authority.' " 76
It has long been the practice of the United States to enter into agreements with other nations to settle claims of the parties'
respective nationals. 77 The agreements sometimes take the form of
treaties but often are executive agreements reached without the
advice and consent of the Senate. 78 "Crucial to [the Court's opinion]
is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement." 79 The Court
found certain statutory enactments and continued congressional
acquiescence in the practice to be evidence of such approval. First,
the Congress in 1949 enacted the International Claims Settlement
Act. 80 Through the Act, Congress created the International Claims
Commission 81 and gave it jurisdiction to hear and decide claims by
United States nationals against settlement funds established
74. Id.
75. _ U . S . _ , 101 S. Ct. 2777 (1981).
76. Id. (quoting in part Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952)).
77. U.S.-· 101 s. Ct. at 2986. See also, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 262 (1972); 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (1970). These
agreements include: 30 U.S.T. 1957 (1979) (People's Republic of China); 27 U.S.T. 3993 (1976)
(Peru); 27 U.S.T. 4214 (1976) (Egypt); 25 U.S.T. 227 (1974) (Peru); 24 U.S.T. 522 (1973)
(Hungary); 20 U.S.T. 2654 (1969) (Japan); 16 U.S.T. 1 (1965) (Yugoslavia); 14 U.S.T. 969 (1963)
(Bulgaria); 11U.S.T.1953 (1960) (Poland); 11 U.S.T. 317 (1960) (Rumania).
78. _
U.S. _ , 101 S. Ct. at 2987. The Court acknowledged that many of the settlement agreements cited were consented to by the claimants but noted that the '"United
States has sometimes disposed of the claims of citizens without their consent, or even
without consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as
distinguished from those of the nation as a whole.'" Id. (quoting L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 262, 263 (1972)). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 2313 (1965).
79. _ U . S . _ , 101 S. Ct. at 2987.
80. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1644m (1979 & Supp. 1980).
81. The International Claims Commission is now the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
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through settlement agreements. 82 The Court concluded that, by
creating this procedure, Congress had given its approval to settlement agreements. The fact that Congress continued to accept the
President's claim settlement authority, despite numerous amendments to the International Claims Settlement Act, further supported this conclusion. Additional support for congressional approval was found in the legislative history of the IEEPA which
stated "nothing in this Act is intended to interfere with the
authority of the President to continue blocking assets ... or to impede the settlement of claims of United States citizens against
foreign countries." 83
Petitioner had raised two strong arguments against the conclusion that Congress acquiesced in the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement. First, petitioner contended that
reliance on practice prior to 1952 was misplaced in light of changes
in the doctrine of sovereign immunity subsequent to that date. 84
Acknowledging that this contention was "not wholly without
merit," the Court nonetheless found it was refuted by the
post-1952 practice of claim settlement through executive agreement.
Petitioner's second assertion was that Congress divested the
President of authority in this area when it enacted the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 85 which gives federal district
courts jurisdiction over commercial suits against foreign states
that have waived immunity. Petitioner contended that by suspending claims against Iran, the President circumscribed the jurisdiction of the courts, thereby violating article III of the
Constitution. 86 The Court rejected this contention stating that the
effect of the President's order was to suspend claims, not divest
the courts of jurisdiction. The President had simply changed the
82. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2987 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)).
83. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2989 (citing S. REP. No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1977)).
84. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2989. Prior to 1952, the United States adhered to the
doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. As a result, the only avenue for recourse against a
foreign government was through a settlement agreement. In 1952, the United States
adopted a restricted view of sovereign immunity. Thus, citizens had a judicial remedy,
albeit limited, and therefore no longer had to rely exclusively on the Executive to pursue
their claims.
85. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2989, (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 (Supp. 1980)).
86. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2989.
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substantive law governing the lawsuit. 87 In addition, the Court
noted that the FSIA was enacted to eliminate only one barrier to
suit, that is sovereign immunity; it was not enacted to prohibit the
President from settling claims against foreign governments. 88
The Court concluded that the President was authorized to
suspend pending claims.
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstown, "a
systematic, unbroken executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and never before questioned . .. may be
treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President
by§ 1 of Art. II." Past practice does not, by itself, create power,
but "long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] has been
[taken] in pursuance of its consent ...." Such practice is present
here and such a presumption is also appropriate. 89

Having so concluded, the Court cautioned against too broad a
reading of its holding or analysis.
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to
settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities ....
But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and
where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the
President's action, we are not prepared to say that the President
lacks the power to settle such claims.90

2.

MARSCHALK V. IRAN NAT'L AIRLINES CORP.

Judge Duffy not only refused to find express authority for the
President's action suspending claims in the IEEP A but read that
87. The Court used sovereign immunity to support its point. "No one would suggest
that a determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal courts of 'jurisdiction.' Yet
petitioner's argument, if accepted, would have required courts prior to the enactment of the
FSIA to reject as an encroachment on their jurisdiction the President's determination of a
foreign state's sovereign immunity." Id.
88. Indeed, in considering enactment of the FSIA, the court noted that Congress considered and rejected proposals to limit this executive power. Id. n. 11. See Congressional
Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
243-261, 302-311 (1975); Congressional Review of International Agreements, Hearings before
theSubcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 167, 246 (1976).
89. _U.S._, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2990 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 2991.
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act as indicating a legislative intent to prohibit such action. 91 Additionally, the FSIA was read by Judge Duffy to prohibit the
suspension of claims.
This conclusion was drawn in large part from the legislative
history of the FSIA. The original draft of the FSIA, proposed by
the Departments of Justice and State, provided that the act would
be "subject to existing and future international agreements." 92
The reference to future international agreements was deleted in
committee. Judge Duffy reasoned "[i]t would be totally incongruous if Congress took away from the executive the power to
dispose of certain lawsuits against foreign governments by 'suggestions of immunity' and yet intended to permit the same by international executive agreements." 93
Unlike the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore, the district
court engaged in an extensive analysis of the constitutionality of
the President's suspension of claims in United States courts.
Because Judge Duffy viewed the President's action not only as
lacking congressional authorization, but also as incompatible with
the will of Congress, the President's authority, according to
Justice Jackson's analysis in Youngstown, could be based only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers possessed by Congress in the matter. 94 "In this situation,
the President's power is 'at its lowest ebb' and the assertion of
such power 'must be scrutinized with caution ....' " 95
Recognizing that the executive's powers in foreign affairs extend beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, 96
Judge Duffy turned to the question of "whether the Executive
Agreement and Presidential Orders terminating this litigation do
in fact upset 'the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system' by infringing upon the powers of Congress and the
judiciary." 97 Judge Duffy concluded that the President's action infringed upon both. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution extends the judicial power of the federal courts to all
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
(1936)).
97.

518 F. Supp. at 79.
H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1604 (1976). 518 F. Supp. at 82.
518 F. Supp. at 82.
Id. at 84. 343 U.S. 579, 637. (Jackson, J., concurring).
518 F. Supp. at 84.
Id. at 85, (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exporting Corp., 299 U.S. 304
Id. at 86.
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cases between "a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects." The Constitution additionally provides that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be defined by
the Congress. 98 Despite the constitutional and congressional
authority given the federal courts over the claims in the Iranian
assets litigation, "[t]he government ... contend[s] that the President has the authority to suspend litigation in United States
courts and transfer claims to a tribunal under his broad and
plenary authority to conduct foreign affairs." 99 The government's
contention in the district court was based on the presidential
power to settle claims of American nationals against foreigners.
Judge Duffy was not as willing as the Supreme Court in Dames &
Moore 100 to accept either the asserted scope of that power or its
relevance to this case. First, Judge Duffy doubted that the President actually "settled" the claims of the plaintiffs against Iran. 101
Second, even if the claims were "settled", Congress in the FSIA
had indicated disapproval of the practice. 102
Judge Duffy concluded that,
To find that a President, by virtue of his foreign affairs power,
can dictate the jurisdictional bounds of United States courts
violates both the words and the objectives of our Constitution.
The Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who has
the authority to legislate the jurisdiction of the courts. The
Founders of this Nation entrusted that responsibility to the Congress. The Constitution does not subject this congressional
power to presidential control in times of crisis. 103

E.

Did the President's Actions Suspending the Claims of
American Citizens in Federal Courts Constitute a Taking of
Property in Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution in the Absence of Just Compensation?

98. U.S. CONST. art. I§ 8. The congressional grant of jurisdiction in this case, according to Judge Duffy, is 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 and 1332 (but see Rugeirro, infra at 221-26.) and the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, art. III§ 2, United States-Iran,
Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.l.A.S. No. 3853.
99. 518 F. Supp. at 85.
100. See discussion supra at 173-74.
101. 518 F. Supp. at 88.
102. Id. at 91.
103. Id.
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DAMES & MOORE V. REGAN

The Supreme Court refused to reach the merits of
petitioner's contention that the President's suspension order effected an uncompensated taking of its claim in violation of the fifth
amendment. Petitioner and the government conceded, and the
Court held, that the issue was not yet ripe for review. The very
possibility that the President's actions might effect a taking af
property, however, made ripe the question whether petitioner will
have a remedy in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act 104 if
the action does represent such a taking .105 According to the
Court's opinion in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 106
Court of Claims jurisdiction under the Tucker Act is presumed
over claims arising under the Constitution, congressional acts, or
executive regulations. One exception to the general presumption
of jurisdiction is contained in section 1502 of the Tucker Act.
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the Court of
Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim against the United
States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty entered into
with foreign nations. 107

At oral argument in Dames & Moore, the government conceded
this exception would not bar petitioner's action in the Court of
Claims. 108 Without discussion, the Court agreed and held that "to
the extent petitioner believes it has suffered an unconstitutional
taking by the suspension of the claims, we see no jurisdictional
obstacle to an appropriate action in the United States Court of
Claims under the Tucker Act." 109
2.

MARSCHALK V. IRAN NAT'L AIRLINES CORP.

Judge Duffy rejected numerous contentions by the government, holding that the President's order suspending claims effected an unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's property. 11° First,
the Government asserted that President Reagan's Executive
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1506 (1976 and Supp. 1979).
_
U.S. _ , 101 S. Ct. at 2992.
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976 and Supp. 1979).
_U.S._, 101 S. Ct. at 2992.
Id.
518 F. Supp. at 94.
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Order 111 did not terminate the lawsuit but rather suspended the
claims. Labeling the practical distinction between terminating and
suspending lawsuits as unclear, Judge Duffy concluded that contracts and contract rights are property within the meaning of the
fifth amendment and that the extinguishing of plaintiff's right to
enforce its contract claim constituted a taking. 112
The Government argued that if the President's action effected a taking, plaintiff received value for it because he can bring
the claim before an international tribunal with an increased
chance of prevailing on the merits since Iran will not have
available the defense of sovereign immunity or Act of State.
Judge Duffy disagreed.
Marschalk gains nothing by the alleged waiver by Iran of
sovereign immunity or act of state defense. Under the FSIA and
the Treaty of Amity, Iran is not entitled to those defenses in the
United States courts when the proceedings involve a commercial
claim. Furthermore, Marschalk must now pursue its claim in a
foreign country which will undoubtedly increase the time and expense involved in the suit. More importantly, Marschalk must
litigate its claim before an overtly political Tribunal without our
constitutional guarantees of due process. 113

F.

Analysis

Whenever the Supreme Court is called upon to decide legal
issues that arise from, and are closely related to, political events,
troublesome questions are raised as to the proper role of the
judiciary vis-d-vis the other branches of government. When the
conduct of American foreign affairs is implicated in such cases, the
Court's task is made more difficult. When, as here, the issues arise
in a unique and dangerous political crisis, involving not only the
prestige and reputation of the United States in the world community but the lives of American citizens as well, it is difficult not
to be sympathetic to the position of the Court. Such sympathy,
however, cannot give way to an uncritical acceptance of the
Court's reasoning, for it is the essence of the Court's role to stand
apart from political and national passions. Indeed, the purpose of
111. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).
112. 518 F. Supp. at 93, (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1933); United
States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 256 U.S. 51 (1921)).
113. Id. at 93-94.
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the Constitution, and thus of the Court sworn to interpret it, is to
protect the individual from government not only in times of calm,
but more importantly, in times of crisis.
The Court's decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan may be
criticized on exactly this ground. The hostage crisis imperiled the
lives of the Americans held captive, at times threatened the peace
of the world, and shook the foundations of international law. It did
not, and could not, change the nature or extent of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. Yet the Constitution seems to
have played a very small role in the Court's analysis of the President's actions. This is not a novel criticism of the Court's interpretation of the executive's power in foreign affairs. Yet this fact
makes Dames & Moore more rather than less troubling. In the
context of the its historical deference to the executive, the
Court's cautionary language against reading its opinion too broadly cannot be reassuring absent a thorough articulation of precisely
what constitutional provision mandates or justifies such
deference. This is not to say that the balance need be struck
against the exercise of executive power; only that one is more confident that a balance exists if the exercise of striking that balance
is witnessed by those whose rights and interests are being weighed.
Despite the absence of a thorough constitutional analysis, the
rationale employed by the Court in Dames & Moore to uphold the
Executive Orders gives some comfort to those who fear an expansion of executive power. Since Justice Jackson's trichotomy
formed the basis for the Court's analysis, the conclusion that the
Executive Order represented a valid exercise of Presidential
power is based largely on the supporting intent of Congress. Thus,
if Congress acts to withdraw authorization for the kinds of action
taken in response to the hostage crisis, the task of convincing the
Court of the validity of such actions will be considerably more difficult.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dames & Moore is only one
chapter of the Iranian assets litigation. Some cases will be decided
by the Claims Tribunal. If the Tribunal's resolution of American
claims is viewed as unacceptable by the claimants, suits will
doubtlessly be filed against the United States in the Court of
Claims. Those suits falling outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
will be litigated in United States courts. The hostage crisis is over;
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the legal problems caused by the severance of political and
economic ties with Iran will continue for years.

IL

OTHER SELECTED CASES

A.

CRIMINAL MATTERS

1.

CALTAGIRONE V. GRANT

Provisional Arrest of Roreign Nationals in United States
Requires Showing of Probable Cause - Article XIII of the
United States Extrad1-tion Treaty with Italy - Right of Party
Requested to Enforce Foreign Arrest Warrant to Demand
Additional Evidence and Information - Due Process
Requirements in Provisional Arrest Cases
In Caltagirone v. Grant, 114 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously held that where the United States is asked as
the "requested party" under the extradition treaty with Italy 115 to
"provisionally arrest" an Italian national pending a formal request
for extradition by the Italian government, a showing of probable
cause to arrest is required. The holding, which reversed the lower
court, was grounded in the language of the statute rather than on
a constitutional requirement.
The Italian government learned in early 1980 that Francisco
Caltagirone, an Italian national wanted in Italy on numerous
charges arising out of his real estate dealings, was in the United
States. 116 The Italian government notified the United States
Department of State that arrest warrants had been issued for
Caltagirone in Italy and applied for a "provisional arrest" of
Caltagirone pursuant to article XIII of Italy's extradition treaty
with the United States, pending a possible request for formal ex114. 629 F.2d 739 (2nd Cir. 1980).
115. Treaty on Extradition, done Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy, 26 U.S.T. 493,
T.I.A.S. No. 8052 (effective March 11, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Treaty].
116. Caltagirone once operated the largest real estate development syndicate in Italy.
The syndicate enjoyed the favor of Italian officials responsible for providing credit through
a government lending institution. The corporations constituting the syndicate were heavily
leveraged and thus the officials' support was critical to the fortunes of the syndicate. In
1976 the government of Italy changed and the syndicate lost its access to easy government
credit. By the fall of 1979, nineteen of the syndicate's companies were declared bankrupt. In
early 1980, warrants issued for Caltagirone's arrest for fraudulent bankruptcy and participation in embezzlement. Caltagirone left for the United States prior to the issuance of
the warrants. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d at 742.
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tradition. 117 A United States attorney prepared a complaint alleging the existence of the Italian warrant and applied to a United
States District Court judge in the Southern District of New York
for a warrant of arrest. No showing of probable cause to believe
Caltagirone had committed a crime in Italy was attempted. The
judge issued a warrant and Caltagirone was arrested. 118
Caltagirone unsuccessfully moved to quash the arrest warrant on the ground, inter alia, that it had been issued without
probable cause. 119 Three days later, Caltagirone renewed his motion and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus .120 Both the motion
and the petition were denied on the ground that his arrest in the
United States was presumptively valid under Italian law. 121
Caltagirone immediately appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Prior to Caltagirone, the Second Circuit had consistently required a determination of probable cause in order to execute a formal extradition. 122 The writ of habeas corpus is available to test
"whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that
there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty ." 123 In
prior cases involving the validity of provisional arrest articles, the
Second Circ_u it did not require a showing of probable cause. 124 A
complaint charging the accused with an extraditable offense,
117. Id. at 742-743.
118. Id. at 743.
119. Id.
120. The petition was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). Subsection (c) of that
statute provides in pertinent part:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States . . ..
121. In re Caltagirone, 80 Cr. Misc. No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 1980).
122. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d
894 (2nd Cir. 1973); Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925).
123. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. at 312.
The requirement that probable cause be shown in extradition proceedings is not unique
to the Second Circuit. In Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976), the court stated that
"[t]he purpose of [an extradition hearing] is to inquire into the presence of probable cause to
believe that there has been a violation of one or more of the criminal laws of the extraditing
country, [and] that the alleged conduct, if committed in the United States, would have been
a violation of our criminal law." Id. at 1249.
See also Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d at 482.
124. Ex parte Dinehart, 188 F. 858 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); United States v. Marasco, 325
F.2d 562 (2nd Cir. 1963).
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coupled with a statement assuring the requested party that a formal extradition request was forthcoming, was deemed sufficient to
support provisional arrest of that person pending production of
the appropriate documents. 125
Article XIII of the United States extradition treaty with Italy
states that, "[i]n case of urgency a Contracting Party may apply
for the provisional arrest of the person sought pending the presentation of the request for extradition ...." The article further provides that an application for provisional arrest must contain four
elements: a description of the person sought; an indication of intention to request the extradition of the person sought; a statement of the existence of a warrant for arrest against that person;
and "such further information, if any, as would be necessary to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest had the offense been
committed ... in the territory of the requested Party ." 126 The first
three requirements were satisfied in the instant case. 127 Only the
final requirement was seriously in issue in Caltagirone.
The Italian warrant was issued against Caltagirone on a
charge of fraudulent bankruptcy. Such conduct is prohibited in the
United States. 128 To justify issuance of a warrant in this country, a
showing of probable cause would have been required. 129 Yet the
government conceded and the record confirmed that no showing
of probable cause was made prior to issuance of the warrant for
petitioner's arrest. Italy's request for provisional arrest contained
125. Ex parte Dinehart 188 F. at 859.
126. Treaty, supra note 115, at 502.
127. There was no doubt as to the identity of Caltagirone. According to the facts, upon
learning of Caltagirone's presence in the U.S., Italy applied for his provisional arrest "pending a possible request for his extradition to Italy." Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d at 743. It is
unclear whether the "possibility" of a formal extradition request satisfied the requirement
of "intention to request formal extradition." Perhaps because Italy in fact made such a request upon expiration of the forty-five-day period of provisional detention, the court did not
feel constrained to address the question. Id. at 749.
The third requirement-that of a statement of the existence of a warrant-simply requires a factual determination that such a warrant exists. Id. at 744. The court noted that
the treaty does not contemplate review of the validity of the warrant under Italian law. On
this issue, deference to foreign judicial determination is proper. Accordingly, the finding of
the district court that a warrant had issued, which was based on the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York's sworn complaint alleging its existence, was sufficient. Id.
at 743, 744.
128. 18 u.s.c. §§ 152, 656, 1006.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.
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no such "further information" as would support probable cause to
believe that Caltagirone had committed an extraditable offense.
The language of article XIII closely parallels that of article
XI, the formal extradition article, which requires "such evidence
as, according to the laws of the requested Party, would justify his
arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed
there ...." 13° Construing the language of article XI as requiring a
showing of probable cause, and noting the obvious parallel between it and the language of article XIII, the court concluded that
the drafters of the extradition treaty contemplated a showing of
probable cause under both articles in all cases where the United
States is the "requested Party" whether the request is for provisional arrest or formal extradition. 181
The government conceded that Italy must provide such "further information" as would establish probable cause, but maintained that the information must be provided only to the executive
branch, and not to a court. The court found this argument unacceptable, both in the context of the extradition treaty and in the
context of the diplomatic and statutory backdrop against which article XIII was drafted. As noted above, the language of article
XIII parallels that of article XI, which does not expressly require
presentation of evidence to a magistrate. But the court noted that
18 U.S.C. section 3184, requiring a judicial proceeding in all formal
extradition requests, imposes a probable cause requirement as a
precondition to formal extradition. 132 The government's contention
that the section 3184 requirement of a hearing applies to article XI
but not to article XIII, when their language is so similar, was
labeled "untenable" by the court. 133
The government's claim that the language in article XIII
serves merely to create a power in the requested party to demand
additional information was rejected on the ground that where the
treaty authorizes intergovernmental communications it does so
expressly, as in article XIV, which provides that the requested
party may demand additional "evidence" and "information." 134 The
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d at 745 (citing 26 U.S.T. 493, 501, T.I.A.S. No. 8052).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 746.
Id. (citing 26 U.S.T. 493, 502, T.l.A.S. No. 8052).
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court reasoned that since an article XI request concerns
"evidence" and an article XIII request concerns "information", article XIV encompasses both kinds of requests. Therefore, in light
of article XIV, the government's contention that article XIII
serves only to create a power to demand additional information
would render that portion of article XIII "mere surplusage." 135
The court's reasoning here is flawed, because article XIV
specifically refers to "additional evidence or information to enable
[the requested party] to decide on the request for extradition"
(emphasis added). There is no reference to requests for provisional arrest, and it is possible to assume that "information" as
well as "evidence" might be required in making the decision
whether to extradite.
The court proceeded to note that other American treaties
authorize provisional arrest in "urgent" cases without a "further
information" requirement. 136 Therefore, provisional arrest provisions fall into one of two categories: those with and those without
the informational requirement. The fact that, faced with such a
choice, the drafters of the extradition treaty elected to include the
requirement, buttresses the conclusion that presentation of "such
futher 'information" as might be needed to justify arrest (e.g., a
showing of probable cause) is a necessary condition for provisional
arrest under the United States-Italy treaty. 137
Finally, the government contended that since article XI clearly requires a showing of probable cause, to infer the existence of
such a requirement from the similar language of article XIII would
eradicate the distinctions between the two procedures, thereby
defeating the drafters' intention to provide a more "streamlined"
mechanism for accommodating requests from foreign nations than
"full-blown extradition proceedings." 138
In response to this argument, the court noted that the contemplated proceedings do indeed differ in several crucial
respects, 139 but that the draftsmen did not intend to streamline the
135. Id. at 746 n.14.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 747.
139. The differences between provisional arrest and formal extradition proceedings
are as follows:
(a) Article XIII requires "information," listing no formalities for its provisions. Since time is of the essence in an "urgent" case, the court found that applica-
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article XI procedure at the expense of sacrificing the protection of
the probable cause requirement. 140 It is the procedural differences
between the provisional arrest proceeding and the formal extradition proceeding that make it unnecessary to sacrifice a probable
cause requirement in the former in order to distinguish the two.
On the basis of "overwhelming evidence," the court held that
article XIII prohibits provisional arrest without probable cause,
disposing of the case on the ground that the treaty language
seems "clearly to require [a showing of probable cause]." 141 By
holding that article XIII prohibits provisional arrest without probable cause, the court avoided the question whether the Constitution mandates a probable cause determination before a provisional
arrest. Nevertheless, the court commented on the constitutional
question in dicta. 142
The court was troubled by two features of the provisional arrest mechanism. First, the government had asserted that the
United States could detain the petitioner under provisional arrest
for forty-five days without a showing of probable cause, yet petitioner had no guarantee that his detention would end, either with
release or formal extradition to Italy, when the forty-five day
period expired. Extradition proceedings which end in the
arrestee's release from custody do not bar subsequent extradition
demands by the requesting state on the same charge. 143 Under the
tion for provisional arrest may be made wholly by telecommunications. This conclusion is supported by 18 U.S.C. § 3187, which expressly provides for "telegraphic
request" for provisional arrest.
Article XI, on the other hand, requires "evidence" and necessarily implies a
greater procedural formality than provision of "information." Unlike article XIII,
article XI requires certified depositions establishing probable cause and a copy of
the actual arrest warrant issued by the magistrate in the requesting state.
(2) Article XIII allows direct communication between Italian and American
law enforcement officials, whereas article XI calls for transmission of depositions
and warrants through diplomatic channels prior to their relay to law enforcement
officials.
(3) Under article XI, the requesting state must "prove," not allege (as under)
article XIII), that the relator is the person named in the warrants, and must provide extensive documentation of its law regarding the particular offense, detailing
"the law defining the offense, the law prescribing the punishment for the offense,
and the law relating to the limitation of legal proceedings or the enforcement of
the penalty for the offense." 26 U.S.T. 493, 501; T.I.A.S. No. 8052.
140. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 797 (2nd Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 742.
142. Id. at 748.
143. Treaty, art. XIV, 26 U.S.T. 493, 502; T.I.A.S. No. 8052.
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government's view, a foreign state could request, and the government effectuate, the unlimited detention of the arrestee through a
series of forty-five-day provisional arrests-without a judicial
determination of probable cause and without any formal extradition request. 144 Second, any suggestion that aliens are accorded
"lesser" rights under the Constitution is not determinative, as the
treaty applies to American citizens and aliens alike. Acceptance of
the government's interpretation of article XIII as not requiring a
showing of probable cause would result in the government having
the ability to arrest and indefinitely detain an American citizen
simply upon the allegation by a foreign government that a warrant for the arrest of that citizen was outstanding. 145 These
features "[raise] grave questions concerning the constitutional propriety of any interpretation of article XIII which does not require
a showing of probable cause." 146
Two months before deciding Caltagirone, the Second Circuit
spoke in dictum about the constitutional requirements for extradition proceedings in Rosado v. Civiletti. 141 "[T]o the extent that the
United States itself acts to detain [the arrestee] pending extradition, it is bound to accord him due process." 148 The court noted that
although the United States Constitution does not limit the power
of a foreign sovereign to prescribe the procedures for trial and
punishment of crimes committed within its own territory, "it does
govern the manner in which the United States may join the
effort." 149 In this sense, Rosado and Caltagirone reflect a consistent view of the role of the United States Constitution and the
federal judiciary in criminal cases which involve transnational institutions. While the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution is
limited, certain constitutional guarantees inhere whenever United
States courts or officials play a role in the apprehension or detention of an individual, whether citizen or alien.
2.

ROSADO V. CIVILETTI

Rights of United States Citizens Under the United States-Mexico
Prisoner Transfer Treaty - Voluntariness of Consent to Transfer
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

629 F.2d at 747.
Id. at 748.
Id.
621 F.2d 1179, discussed infra at pp. 186-97.
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1195-96.
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Agreements - Waiver of Prisoner's Right to Challenge Conviction
-Balancing the Habeas Corpus Privilege Against the Threatened
Viability of the Prisoner Transfer Treaty
The question of the scope of constitutional rights possessed
by United States citizens who have been convicted of crimes, imprisoned in foreign countries and subsequently transferred to
United States prisons pursuant to prisoner transfer treaties has
been presented frequently to federal courts. 150 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals gave the most comprehensive consideration of
the subject to date in Rosado v. Civiletti. 151
Petitioners, three United States citizens, were arrested in
Mexico, tortured, denied even the semblance of a fair trial, and incarcerated under inhumane conditions. 152 After petitioners had
been imprisoned for two years, the United States and Mexico concluded and signed a prisoner transfer treaty. 153 Under the treaty, a
prisoner transferred to prisons within his home country must
waive any right to seek a modification or reversal of the sentence
or conviction in his home nation's courts. 154 Stated another way,
150. Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980); Mitchell"·
United States, 483 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Orozco v. United States Bureau of Prisons,
No. CV78-2485 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1979); Isbell v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. CV782400-LEWT (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1979); Ruiz v. Bell, No. 79-16 (M.C. Pa. June 29, 1979).
151. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3248
(1980).
152. Petitioners testified at trial to the following events: Petitioners Caban and Velez
were arrested in Mexico City while on a stopover en route to Acapulco. Six armed men in
civilian clothes executed the arrest without a warrant, searched the two men and tortured
them by beating and use of an electric cattle prod. Petitioner Rosado arrived in Mexico two
days later and suffered similar treatment. Each petitioner was taken to a detention center
and given a confession to sign, which all three refused to do. None of the petitioners were
informed of the charges against them, nor were any allowed to obtain legal counsel. For
months they were kept in prison, during which time they were subjected to torture, forced
labor, and extortion. When the three were finally brought to trial, it lasted for less than fifteen minutes. There was neither a judge nor a jury present and only the arresting officers
testified. Petitioners were not allowed to speak or to have counsel present. The trial
violated numerous provisions of the Mexican Constitution. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE
LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANIS, tit. I, chap. I, art. 20 Mexico. Eight months after the trial,
petitioners were informed they had been sentenced to nine years imprisonment for conspiring to import cocaine. The search conducted at the time of arrest did not reveal any narcotics.
Petitioners' testimony was uncontroverted by the government and the court found the
testimony to be credible. Velez v. Nelson, 427 F. Supp. 865, 867, n.3 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd
sub nom. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621F.2d1179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3248 (1980).
153. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, done Nov. 25, 1976, United
States-Mexico 28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718 (effective Nov. 30, 1977) [hereinafter cited
as U.S.-Mexico Treaty).
154. Id. at art. VI.
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under the treaty, the receiving state has no jurisdiction to review
the judicial process of the transferring state. Representatives of
the United States embassy in Mexico visited petitioners and informed them of the possibility of transfer to a United States
prison. 155 Petitioners expressed interest in transferring and later
appeared before a United States magistrate who determined that
petitioners voluntarily and knowledgeably consented to transfer .156
The petitioners were then transferred to a federal prison in Connecticut.
Once their transfers were complete, petitioners sought writs
of habeas corpus in federal district court. 157 The district court
granted the writs on the ground that the consent to transfer given
by the petitioners was involuntary .158 On the basis of its reading of
two relatively recent United States Supreme Court decisions,1 59
the court held that only in light of "all the surrounding circumstances" could voluntariness be determined. 160 The uncontroverted facts of petitioners' mistreatment throughout their incarceration led the court to conclude that petitioners' consent to
transfer and their resultant waiver of any right to challenge their
convictions was invalid. 161 The United States, the court held, could
not lawfully retain custody over petitioners. 162
155. Each petitioner was given a booklet prepared by the United States Department of
Justice explaining the provisions of the treaty and the consequences of taking advantage of
the transfer opportunity.
The booklet specifically advised that because the Treaty gave Mexico exclusive
jurisdiction over actions brought by transferees to challenge, modify, or set aside
sentences imposed by its courts, a United States citizen who transferred to
American custody would not have any legal remedies available in the United
States to challenge, modify, or set aside his conviction or sentence. The booklet
went on to state, however, that neither the Treaty nor its implementing legislation
"seeks to prevent transferring offenders from bringing habeas corpus actions to
challenge the constitutionality of the Treaty and/or the implementing legislation,
or the manner of the execution of their confinement by United States authorities."
Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1188 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INFORMATION BOOKLET FOR
UNITED STATES CITIZENS INCARCERATED IN MEXICAN PRISONS 7 (1977)).
156. Id. at 1189.
157. Id. at 1182.
158. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. at 874.
159. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975).
160. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. at 873.
161. Id. at 874.
162. Id.
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The district court's decision immediately threatened any
future transfer of United States prisoners from Mexican jails. 163
The United States Government promptly appealed the decision
and the Mexican government continued the transfer program
pending an appellate decision in the case. 164
In order that the reader understand the issues presented to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the rationale used by the
court in resolving those issues, it is necessary to describe briefly
the salient features of the United States-Mexico prisoner transfer
treaty, which is the model for other similar treaties concluded between the United States and foreign nations. 165
In 1976, the United States State Department began to
negotiate bilateral prisoner transfer treaties. The treaty with
Mexico was negotiated and signed in November, 1976 and went into force a year later. 166 Eligibility for transfer requires that the
prisoner's offense not fall within an excluded category 167 ; the offense must be punishable in the prisoner's home state 168 ; there
must be at least six months remaining in the prisoner's sentence 169;
and no appeal can be pending in the transferring state. 110 If these
eligibility requirements are satisfied, the transfer procedure may
be initiated by the transferring state. 111 The mechanics of prisoner
transfers are set forth in the treaty. Free and informed consent by
the prisoner to the terms of the transfer is required under the
163. See interview with Salvador Compos, Minister, Mexican Embassy, in Washington,
D.C. (March 11, 1980) reported in Note, "The Impact of Rosado v. Civiletti on U.S. Prisoner
Transfer Treaties", 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 131, 151 (1980).
164. Id.
165. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, done March 2, 1977, United States
-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 6263, T.l.A.S. No. 9552 (effective July 19, 1978); Treaty on the Execution
of Penal Sentences, done Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, 30 U.S.T. 796, T.l.A.S. No.
9219 (effective Aug. 17, 1978); Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, done Jan. 11,
1979, United States - Panama,_ U.S.T. _ , T.l.A.S. No. 9787 (effective June 27, 1980);
Treaty on the Enforcement of Penal Judgments, done June 7, 1979, United States - Turkey,
_
U.S.T. _ , T.l.A.S. No. 9892 (effective Jan. l, 1981); Treaty on the Execution of Penal
Sentences, done July 6, 1979, United States - Peru,_ U.S.T. _ , T.l.A.S. No. 9784 (effective July 21, 1980).
166. United States - Mexico Treaty, supra, note 153.
167. Id. at art. 11(4): The exclusions include prisoners under a death sentence, military
offenses, political offenses and immigration offenses.
168. Id. at art. 11(1).
169. Id. at art. 11(5).
170. Id. at art. 11(6).
171. Id. at art. IV(l).
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treaty .112 If the prisoner consents and both states approve, the
transfer is effectuated. The most controversial of the terms of the
transfer treaties is illustrated by article VI of the United StatesMexico treaty:
The Transferring State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge,
modify or set aside sentences handed down by its courts. The
Receiving State shall, upon being advised by the Transferring
State of action affecting the sentence, take the appropriate action in accordance with such advice. 173

Although transferees must waive any right to challenge their
sentences, they gain a significant advantage upon transfer by having the opportunity for early parole in the United States. 174
While acknowledging that petitioners' convictions
"manifested a shocking insensitivity to their dignity as human beings and were obtained under criminal process devoid of even a
scintilla of rudimentary fairness and decency ," 175 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals nonetheless reversed the decision of the
district court and denied _relief. In a lengthy opinion, Judge Kaufman examined the constitutional issues of due process and consent.
The first issue considered by the court was the issue upon
which the district court had disposed of the case: whether the petitioners' consents to transfer 176 had been voluntary. The district
court, relying on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 111 held that the consents were not voluntary. The United States Supreme Court in
Schneckloth rejected a static definition of voluntariness,
172. Id. at art. IV(2).
173. Id. at art. VI.
174. United States - Mexico Treaty, supra, note 153, art. V(2) provides that "the completion of a transferred offender's sentence shall be carried out according to the laws and
procedures of the Receiving State, including the application of any provisions for reduction
of the term of confinement by parole, conditional release or otherwise."
175. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F .2d at 1182.
176. The first issue focused on the petitioners' consent to transfer only. This is significant to an understanding of the court's opinion for two reasons. First, the issue of the voluntariness of the consent to transfer should not be confused with the issue of the voluntariness
of the waiver of any right to challenge the conviction and sentence in United States courts,
treated later in the opinion. Second, the question of the voluntariness of the consent to
transfer can be reviewed by the court under the terms of the treaty. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
INFORMATION BOOKLET FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS INCARCERATED IN MEXICAN PRISONS 7
(1977).
177. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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characterizing the question of voluntariness as one "of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances." 178 The district court focused its attention not on compliance with the consent requirements of the transfer treaty, but on the treatment of petitioners during their pretrial and post trial incarceration in Mexico.
The court held that the length of petitioners' detention, the nature
of the questioning to which they were subjected, and the occurrence of physical punishment rendered petitioners' consent invalid.179 Although the court held that the United States did not
have lawful custody over petitioners, the United States made no
effort to return petitioners to Mexico nor did Mexico seek such a
return. 180
The Second Circuit reversed. The court, rather than focusing
on the circumstances of petitioners' convictions and incarceration,
focused on compliance with the statutory procedures governing
transfer of prisoners. These procedures "are carefully structured
to ensure that each [petitioner] voluntarily and intelligently
agreed to forego his right to challenge the validity of his Mexican
conviction ...." 181 The court rejected the lower court's reliance on
Schneckloth, pointing out that the policy considerations underlying the holding in that case were not apposite here. First, the rule
in Schneckloth was designed to "define the degree to which
overzealous law enforcement would be deterred, and individual
rights vindicated." 182 Such a goal would be ineffective in the context of the transfer treaty, since United States courts cannot alter
the methods of law enforcement in Mexico. 183
178. Id. at 248-49.
179. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. at 873-74.
180. The treaty does not require the receiving country to return prisoners in the event
of some defect in the transfer proceeding or for any other reason. However, 18 U.S.C. §
4114(a) (1976 Supp.) states that:
Upon a final decision by the courts of the United States that the transfer of the offender to the United States was not in accordance with the treaty or the laws of
the United States and ordering the offender released from serving the sentence in
the United States the offender may be returned to the country from which he was
transferred to complete the sentence if the country in which the sentence was imposed requests his return.
The treaty does not give the transferring state a legal right to demand return of such an offender.
181. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1182.
182. Id. at 1189.
183. Id. The United States Constitution does not protect American citizens from the
governmental acts of foreign states. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901).
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Second, the liberty interests involved in Schneckloth are in
no way related to the liberty interests present in Rosado. According to the court, a more precise analogy exists between the interests of petitioners and those of accused defendants offered a
choice between pleading guilty (where the sanction is guaranteed)
and going to trial (where the precise nature of the sanction, if any,
is unknown). The court analyzed cases involving guilty pleas in
light of two issues. The first was whether the choice facing petitioners unconstitutionally conditioned a constitutional right. 184 The
court concluded that the requirement of a waiver of the right to
challenge the foreign conviction was "neither needless or arbitrary" and thus that the condition was permissible. 185 Second,
the court considered whether the consent to transfer was an informed and intelligent act done with a full awareness of the situation.186 The choice facing petitioners was between continued incarceration under brutal conditions in Mexico or transfer to the
United States, conditioned upon waiver of any right to challenge
the Mexican conviction in United States courts. Faced with this
choice, "if the instant petitioners' consents to transfer are viewed
184. One commentator has described the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as
follows:
Generally, the doctrine states that while a government, state or federal, may not
be obligated to provide its citizens with a certain benefit or privilege, it may not
grant the benefit or privilege on conditions requiring the recipient in some manner
to relinquish his constitutional rights. Furthermore, it cannot withhold or cancel
the benefit as a price for the assertion of such rights.
Robbins, A Constitutional Analysis of the Prohibition Against Collateral Attack in the
Mexican-American Prisoner Exchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 37 (1978).
The court looked to United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), in considering
whether the provisions of the prisoner transfer treaty impermissibly conditioned a constitutional right. In that case, the court invalidated a provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act
allowing imposition of the death penalty only when recommended by a jury, holding that the
provision "needlessly" induced defendants to waive the constitutional right to a jury trial.
Id. at 583. In a later case, the court emphasized that a condition is impermissable only if it
"needlessly penalize[d] the assertion of a constitutional right." Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 746 (1970) (citing United States v. Jackson).
185. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1200. The court identified three important interests of the government in requiring the waiver: acceptance of the treaty by Mexico required waiver of the right to challenge (id. at 1200); good relations between the United
States and Mexico were supported by "honoring [Mexico's] criminal convictions and
recognizing the integrity of its criminal justice system" (id. at 1190); and Americans held in
Mexican prisons benefitted by the transfer treaty (id. at 1200).
186. Id. at 1191 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)). The situation as
described by the court included circumstances surrounding the choice, the likely consequences of the choice, and all available alternatives.
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in light of the alternatives legitimately available to them, it cannot
be seriously doubted that their decisions were voluntarily and intelligently made." 187
Having determined that petitioners' consents to transfer
were voluntary, the court turned to the due process issue raised
by petitioners. The challenge to the prisoner transfer treaty was
thus posed by Judge Kaufman: whether the United States government may imprison a citizen in execution of a foreign criminal conviction and deny that citizen access to a United States court to
challenge the fundamental fairness of the criminal process which
led to his conviction. 188 After concluding that the prisoner transfer
treaty was a valid exercise of the treaty-making power,189 the
court considered whether the treaty violated any procedural or
substantive constitutional guarantees. 190 While it is well established that the government may punish citizens only in accordance
with the due process guarantees of the Constitution,191 the question whether those guarantees require that any person have a
right of access to a United States court to test the basis for imposition of a sentence has never been fully resolved. 192 After reviewing
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1192.
189. Id. at 1193. The court recognized that the courts of a country are not required to
execute the penal laws of another country. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
However, a country may choose to extend recognition to such penal laws. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1192. The instant treaty does not call for United States enforcement of Mexico's penal laws but simply provides for execution of a Mexican criminal conviction. The
treaty serves two purposes which render it a valid exercise of the treaty-making power
under art. II § 2, cl.2 of the Constitution: the condition of Americans imprisoned in Mexican
jails is ameliorated and relations between Mexico and America are improved by lessening
the burden on the Mexican criminal system. Id. at 1193.
190. The court focused specifically on the fifth and sixth amendments. The fifth amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall any person ...
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
191. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1866).
192. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1194.
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cases outlining the nature and extent of process due American
citizens who have committed crimes abroad and foreigners sought
to be extradited by their governments, 193 the court concluded that
"[t]he right to a fair procedure reasonably calculated to produce a
correct determination of the·basis for the imposition of penal sanctions lies at the heart of the due process of law protected by the
Fifth Amendment." 194 Therefore, petitioners here have the right to
test in a United States court the basis for their continued confinement in a United States prison. 195
Having determined that the petitioners had such a right, the
court considered whether petitioners were estopped from asserting that right based upon their agreement to the conditions of the
transfer, one of which was giving up any right to challenge the
conviction in their national courts. The court pointed to Congress'
effort to insure that prisoners seeking transfer would be fully informed of the treaty's provisions and would agree to abide by such
provisions. 196 The treaty requires express agreement by the
prisoner to challenge the conviction or sentence in Mexican courts
only .197 In light of the stringent consent requirement, the court
points out, it is unlikely that either Mexico or the United States
would have consented to petitioners' transfer had petitioners not
consented to abide by the treaty's conditions. 198 The court did not
find this fact alone determinative of the question whether petitione'rs should be estopped on the basis of this agreement from
challenging their convictions in the United States. Rather, the
government had to show that it relied to its detriment upon petitioners' agreement. Thus the court pursued a dual analysis: first,
whether the petitioners voluntarily and intelligently agreed to
challenge their convictions in Mexican courts only, and second,
193. Id. at 1194-97.
194. Id. at 1197.
195. Id. The court made clear that its holding did not imply that every element of due
process "as known to American criminal law" must be met in a foreign criminal proceeding
in order for Congress to give a conviction arising out of such proceeding a binding effect
within the United States. Id. at 1198. Rather, the holding only applies where a petitioner is
incarcerated under federal authority pursuant to a foreign conviction, in which case he "cannot be denied all access to a United States court when he presents a persuasive showing
that his conviction was obtained without the benefit of any process whatsoever." Id.
196. Id.
197. S. 1682, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(b)(l) (1977).
198. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1199.
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whether the United States advanced a sufficiently important interest to hold petitioners to their agreement. 199
The court found petitioners' decision to agree to abide by the
treaty's condition of a restricted right of review to be both informed and intelligent in light of the alternatives available to them, 200
and held that the choice presented petitioners did not "needlessly
penalize" the constitutional right to a United States forum. 201 The
congressional decision to require transferring prisoners to abide
by the limitation on their right to a judicial review of their convictions in the United States was "neither needless nor arbitrary." 202
Two strong government interests flow from requiring that
transferring prisoners so agree. 203 First, the treaty represented a
lessening of tensions between the United States and Mexico. 204 Second was the interest of those Americans still incarcerated in
Mexican prisons. 205 This factor may have been most compelling to
the court.
We refuse to scuttle the one certain opportunity open to
Americans incarcerated abroad to return home, an opportunity,
we note, the benefit of which [petitioners] have already received.
In holding these petitioners to this bargain, we by no means condone the shockingly brutal treatment to which they fell prey.
Rather, we hold open the door for others similarly victimized to
escape their torment. 206

In Rosado, the court was placed in the unenviable position of
being called upon to reconcile two strong United States policies
that appeared to clash. The United States Constitution provides,
in clear and unambiguous language, "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety requires." 207 The prisoner
transfer treaty between the United States and Mexico fashions a
199. Id.
200. At this point the court's discussion intersects with its treatment of the voluntariness of petitioners' consent to transfer. See note 176 supra.
201. Id. at 1200, applying the test set forth in Jackson. See note 184, supra.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1200-01.
207. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2.
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the United
delicate balance of the interests of both nations
States interest in removing its citizens from inhumane treatment
and harsh conditions in Mexican jails and the Mexican interest in
assuring that Americans convicted of crimes within Mexican territory are punished. An essential feature of that balance is the requirement that prisoners transferred pursuant to the treaty waive
any right to challenge their convictions or sentences in United
States courts.
Constitutional questions regarding the prisoner transfer
mechanism of the treaty were raised and debated even before the
treaty entered into force. Indeed, such questions were raised during hearings on the treaty by members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. 208 Testimony before the Committee uniformly supported the constitutionality of the treaty. 209 These constitutional questions stimulated academic debate as well. 210
The court's thoughtful consideration of the constitutional
questions presented in Rosado, and particularly its careful reading
of the relevent provisions of the treaty, may put the constitutional
debate to rest or at least focus it more narrowly upon what the
treaty actually allows and prohibits. In considering whether the
petitioners' consent to transfer was voluntary, the court, unlike
the district court, took a focused view of the circumstances under
which prisoners face the choice available under the treaty. By the
nature of the district court's definition of petitioners' situation,
that court essentially reviewed the conviction and sentence of the
Mexican court, an inquiry which is expressly prohibited by the
treaty. By requiring that the petitioners' consent to the transfer
procedure be intelligently and knowledgeably made at the time
transfer is being considered without direct reference to or consideration of the acts of Mexican judicial or penal authorities, the
208. See Penal Treaties with Mexico and Canada: Hearings on Exec. D and Exec. H
before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
209. Id. at 46-50, 85, 86, 90-130.
210. See, e.g., Abramovsky, A Critical Evaluation of the American Transfer of Penal
Sanctions Policy, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 25; Abramovsky and Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the
Newly Ratified Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REV.
275, 302-16 (1979); Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Mexican and Canadian
Prisoners by the United States Government, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67 (1979); Robbins,
A Constitutional Analysis of the Prohibition Against Collateral Attack in the MexicanAmerican Prisoner Exchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1978); Vagts, A Reply to "A
Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty," 64 IOWA
L. REV. 325 (1979).
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circuit court honored the terms of the treaty. In addition, the
court's holding avoided the absurd result that would have followed
from the district court's analysis. According to that court's rationale, those who suffer the most by repressive treatment at the
hands of the Mexican criminal justice system could never make a
truly voluntary decision to accept transfer to United States
prisons and thus those who would most benefit could not take advantage of the transfer mechanism. In fact, faced with the choice,
a number of American prisoners in Mexican jails have chosen to
remain in Mexico and challenge their convictions through that
country's courts. 211
The Second Circuit's disposition of the due process challenge
is equally well-reasoned. By holding that any American incarcerated in United States prisons has a right to access to United
States courts to challenge the basis of that incarceration, the court
reinforced the fundamental right of habeas review preserved by
the Constitution. It is a well established principle that constitutional rights may be waived. 212 By requiring that petitioners' consent to waive their habeas right to challenge the Mexican conviction meet basic requirements for voluntariness, the court was
able, in a principled way, to preserve the prisoner transfer treaty.
The humanitarian goal underlying the treaty was preserved
without sacrificing constitutionally protected rights.

B.

Civil Matters

1.

FILARTIGA v. PENA-IRALA

Torture Violates the Law of Nations - Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, United States Federal District Courts Can Hear Tort
Claims Based on Acts of Torture - Claims Based on Violations of
the Law of Nations Arise Under the Laws of the United
States-Forum Non Conveniens-Sovereign Immunity-The Act
of State Doctrine - Choice of Law-The Scope of Plaintiffs'
Rights Under the Alien Tort Claims Act
211. Indeed, one man, convicted with petitioners, chose not to transfer and appealed
his conviction, which was overturned for lack of evidence. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at
1189, n.29. For a discussion of reasons why a potential transferee might elect to remain in
Mexican prisons, see Abramovsky and Eagle, supra note 210, at 298.
212. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (waiver of right to counsel); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963) (waiver of right to habeas relief).
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In one of the most important Survey-year cases involving
principles of international law, 213 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that torture conducted by agents of a foreign
government is violative of the law of nations, and that tort claims
based upon such activity fall within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal district courts, under provisions of the Alien Tort
Claims Act. 214 In doing so, the court elevated the protection of
human rights over principles of national sovereignty and outlined
an expanded role for federal courts in the interpretation and application of international law.
A wrongful death claim was brought in federal district court
by Dr. Joel Filartiga against the Inspector General of Police in
Asuncion, Paraguay, Americo Norberto Peiia-Irala, alleging that
the claimant's son had died as a result of torture inflicted upon
him in Paraguay by the defendant. 215 Subject matter jurisdiction
213. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
213a. Id. at 887.
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as§ 1350 or the Act]. The Act was
originally codified in 1789 as part of the First Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
215. The Filartiga litigation arose out of events alleged to have taken place in the
Republic of Paraguay in 1976. Joelito Filartiga, a seventeen year old boy, was allegedly kidnapped and tortured to death by Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, who was then the Inspector
General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. On the same day, Asuncion police officers brought
Dolly Filartiga, Joelito's sister, to Pena's home to view the multilated body of her brother.
Joelito's father, Dr. Joel Filartiga, had been an opponent of Alfredo Stroessner, president of
Paraguay, and the Filartiga family believed Joelito was tortured and killed in retaliation
against his father's political activities.
Shortly after the murder of his son, Dr. Filartiga commenced a criminal action against
Pena and the police in Paraguayan courts. As a result, Filartiga's attorney was arrested by
the police and threatened with death by Pena. As of March 1980, when the Court of Appeals
decided Filartiga, the criminal proceeding was still pending in Paraguay. During the
Paraguayan proceeding, another man, a member of the Pefta household, confessed to the
murder, claiming it was a crime of passion. The Filartigas produced pictures of the corpse to
refute this claim. Despite the confession, the man evidently has never been convicted. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 878.
In 1978, Pena sold his home in Paraguay and gained admittance to the United States
under a visitor's visa. He remained in the United States beyond the term of his visa, living
in Brooklyn, New York with a companion. Dolly Filartiga, who was living in Washington,
D.C. at the time, learned of his whereabouts and informed the Immigration and Naturalization Service of Pena's presence in New York. The Service arrested him and, after a hearing,
ordered him deported.
While Pena was awaiting deportation at the Brooklyn Naval Yard, he was served with
process and a civil complaint filed by the Filartigas. The complaint alleged that he had
wrongfully caused Joelito Filartiga's death by torture and sought $10,000,000 in compen-
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was averred upon a number of grounds, including the Alien Tort
Claims Act, which grants original district court jurisdiction over
"any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the ·law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 216
Acknowledging that "official torture violates an emerging norm of
international law ," 211 the trial court nevertheless dismissed the
claim,218 holding that under Second Circuit precedents the statute
does not confer jurisdiction over claims based upon a foreign
state's treatment of its own nationals. 219 Appeal was taken to the
satory and punitive damages. In addition, the complaint sought to enjoin Pena's deportation. The cause of action was based upon:
wrongful death statutes; the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights; the U .N. Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and practices constituting the customary international law of human rights and the law of
nations ...."
Id. at 879.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). The Act has been invoked rarely. In those cases in which it
was averred as a jurisdictional base, jurisdiction was sustained in only two. Bolchas v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1796); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md.
1961). Those courts denying jurisdiction have given the three elements of the act - alienage,
a cause of action in tort only, and a violation of the law of nations or of a treaty - an extremely narrow construction. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429
U.S. 835 (1976); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc. 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973); Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana,
S.A., Panama, 255 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F.
Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Khedivial Lines, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' International Union, 278
F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
The Filartigas' complaint also sought to base jurisdiction upon the presence of a federal
question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2201 & 2202. Filartiga v. Pei\a-Irala,
630 F .2d at 878 n.3.
217. Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala, No. 79-C-917, Memorandum & Order 4 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
1979).
218. The dismissal was based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction and thus the
court did not reach the forum non conveniens challenge that was also raised by Pena. See p.
202 infra.
219. The precedent followed by the district court was Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976), and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d
Cir. 1975). In Vencap, the court adopted dictum from an earlier § 1350 case to the effect
that:
[A] violation of the law of nations arises only when there has been "a violation by
one or more individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used
by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se."
519 F.2d at 1015. In Dreyfus, the court stated in dictum that "violations of international law
do not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state." 534 F.2d at 31.
The effect of Dreyfus and Vencap was to restrict severely the scope of applicability of the
Act and thus to render it virtually a dead letter for alien litigants.
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 220 which, having heard oral argument and having received a joint opinion from the Departments of
Justice and State in support of jurisdiction,221 unanimously reversed and remanded the case for trial. 222
The court recognized that, lest "the courts of one nation
might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in
the name of applying international law ," 223 section 1350 could not
be invoked as the basis for jurisdiction unless the claimant had
alleged a violation of some rule, within the current content of international law, which commanded "the general assent of civilized
nations." 22' After discussing the principle that states' treatment of
their nationals was a matter of international concern, 225 noting the
"authoritative statements of the international community"
specifically prohibiting torture, 226 and reviewing other documents
evidencing the international consensus regarding the illegality of
torture, 227 the court concluded that "there are few, if any, issues in
international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as
the limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its
custody ." 228 Further, the court reasoned that the rule of international law prohibiting torture "admits of no distinction between
treatment of aliens and the treatment of citizens." 229 Thus, the
Alien Tort Claims Act conferred federal jurisdiction over the
Filartiga's claim, unless the statute itself was found to be unconstitutional.
The relevant portion of the United States Constitution,
limiting the congressional grant of jurisdiction to inferior federal
courts, states that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases ...
arising under ... the laws of the United States." 230 Defendant had
220. Plaintiffs' effort to stay Pefta's deportation was successful prior to the district
court decision. After the decision, plaintiffs were unsuccessful in obtaining further stays
and with the failure of these efforts, Pefta returned to Paraguay before the Second Circuit
rendered its decision. Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala, 630 F.2d at 880.
221. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, id. at 876.
222. Id. The opinion was authored by Judge Irving Kaufman.
223. Id. at 881.
224. Id. (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
225. 630 F.2d at 881-84.
226. Id. at 883.
227. Id. at 881-84.
228. Id. at 881.
229. Id. at 884.
230. U.S. CONST., art. III,§ 2.
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argued that a claim alleging violation of international law is one
"arising under" United States law only if Congress had acted to
codify such international rule within its own legislative enactments.231 Plaintiff had argued that section 1350 itself was such
legislation, defining actionable offenses violative of the law of nations.232 The court rejected defendant's contention and found it unnecessary to rule on plaintiff's suggested interpretation of congressional intent. 233
The court held that a claim "arises under ... the laws of the
United States," if it is grounded upon either congressional enactments or upon the common law of the United States. 234 Because
the law of nations became a part of the common law of the. United
States upon the adoption of the Constitution, a claim concerning a
violation of international law "arises under" United States law, as
required for the constitutional exercise of federal court jurisdiction. The premise was supported by the statement of Chief Justice
Marshall that, in the absence of congressional enactment, courts of
the United States are "bound by the law of nations which is a part
of the law of the land." 235
Having thus determined that the application of the Alien Tort
Claims Act to the Fi/,artiga claim was constitutionally valid, the
court refrained from deciding whether the statute itself, aside
from the transfusion of international law rules into the common
law of the United States, supported a finding that the claim arose
under United States law: "[W]e believe it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens,
but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the
rights already recognized by international law." 236
a. Future Problems
Fi/,artiga paved the way for suits brought in federal courts to
redress violations of international law. Because the case presented
the circuit court with a narrow jurisdictional issue only, there remain a number of questions left unanswered by the court's deci231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

630 F.2d at 884.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 886-87.
Id. at 886.
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815).
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887.
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sion that will likely arise in future section 1350 suits. The discussion below focuses on a few of these questions. It would be impossible in a survey of this type to consider these questions in
great depth. As a result, the following discussion is intended simply to identify legal problems likely to arise in section 1350 suits, to
speculate on the resolution of such problems, and to identify
ramifications of alternative resolutions.

b.

Forum Non Conveniens

The district court dismissed the suit solely on the basis of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore the forum non
conveniens issue raised by Pena in the proceedings below was not
before the circuit court. The appellate court spoke briefly to the·
issue in dictum, however:
[W]e note that the foreign relations implications of this and
other issues the district court will be required to adjudicate on
remand underscores the wisdom of the First Congress in vesting
jurisdiction over such claims in the federal district courts ....
Questions of this nature ... should not be left to the potentially
varying adjudications of the courts of the fifty states. 237

It is not likely that in raising the forum non conveniens issue Pena

was seeking a state, as opposed to a federal, forum in the United
States. Rather, he probably contemplated dismissal of the suit in
favor of a Paraguayan forum. However, a dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds requires not only an alternative forum, but an
effective alternative forum.
Dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens requires that
there be in fact an alternative forum in which the suit can be
maintained. It must appear to a certainty that jurisdiction of all
parties can be had and that complete relief can be obtained in
the supposedly more convenient court. 238

The Filartigas' unsuccessful efforts to bring the alleged murderer
of their son to justice in Paraguay probably would have defeated
Pena's forum non conveniens motion.
Courts faced with section 1350 claims in the future will
doubtless have to rule on forum non conveniens motions. It seems
237. Id. at 890.
238. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,§ 3828, at
179 (1976) (emphasis added).
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probable that such motions will fail. By the very nature of section
1350 suits, most of the evidence and witnesses will be in another
forum, and it is at least possible that the laws of a foreign state
will provide the rule of decision for the case. 239 These factors
weigh in favor of the foreign state being a more convenient forum.
However, where the basis of the suit is the violation of the law of
nations, requiring, as it does, a severe personal wrong committed
by a governmental official within the alternative forum, the court
may be predisposed to retain jurisdiction. Motions to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds will have a better chance of success in those cases in which the violation arises out of an isolated
incident in the foreign state, the plaintiff has not sought redress in
the courts of that state, and officials of that state indicate a willingness to ensure that justice is available.

c.

Sovereign Immunity

Another question, unanswered by Filartiga, is the extent to
which the doctrine of sovereign immunity will protect a defendant
from a suit under the act. Sovereign immunity is available, under
certain circumstances, to shield a foreign state and its governmental officers from suit in United States courts. The doctrine,
judicially recognized in 1812,240 was codified by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 241 The FSIA was enacted in
part to make the judiciary rather than the executive branch (in
particular, the State Department) responsible for determining the
validity of immunity claims. 242 The general rule under the FSIA is
that a foreign state, its agents and instrumentalities are immune
from the jurisdiction of state and federal courts. 243 Thus, an alien
defendant in a suit brought under section 1350 may successfully
avoid a trial on the merits if he falls within the coverage of the
FSIA. 244
Although the language of the FSIA suggests that defendants
may be shielded from suit under section 1350, there are political
reasons why claims of immunity by such defendants may not sue239. See p. 207-09 infra.
240. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
241. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), (2)-(4), 139l(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976).
242. Id. at § 1602.
243. Id. at §§ 1603-04.
244. The FSIA contains a number of exceptions to the immunity it otherwise offers.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a){l)-(5) (1976).
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ceed. Pefia did not claim immunity and thus the application of the
FSIA to him was not in issue. The nature of the case against him
however, will amply illustrate the problem section 1350 defendants will have in seeking immunity from suit. Section 1603 of the
FSIA extensively defines those entities that, for the purposes of
the act, are characterized as agents or instrumentalities of the
foreign state to which immunity is available. 245 Although that section does not expressly require authorization of defendant's conduct by the foreign state, the language of the section does suggest
that an agency relationship between the state and individual is envisioned.246 Torture is expressly prohibited under Paraguayan law
and Pefia could not point to any official government policy enabling him to violate that law. 247 Therefore, the strength of his immunity claim would depend upon some indication by the
Paraguayan government that he was acting as its agent in performing the alleged act. In light of the heinous nature of the crime
alleged to have been committed by Pefia and the domestic and international censure likely to accompany any effort by the
Paraguayan government to accept responsibility for his action, it
is highly unlikely that the government would acknowledge
authorization of the act or ratify the act once committed. In fact, in
any case involving gross violations of human rights, the government whose official is sued is most likely to distance itself from
that official and his actions. Far from accepting responsibility, the
government can be expected to disclaim both authorization and
knowledge of the action. As a result, a defendant's claim of immunity probably will fall on unsympathetic ears within his national government, thus obviating the court's resolution of the
issue.

d.

Act of State

Pefia did argue before the Second Circuit court that "[i]f the
conduct complained of is alleged to be the act of the Paraguayan
government, the suit is barred by the Act of State doctrine." 248
Because the argument was not raised before the lower court, the
circuit court did not decide the issue. However, the court noted in
dictum that it doubted whether:
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 1603(a).
Id.
See Filartigo v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 889.
Id.
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action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws
of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized as an act of
state .... Paraguay's renunciation of torture as a legitimate instrument of state policy, however, does not strip the tort of its
character as an international law violation, if it in fact occurred
under color of government authority .249

The Act of State doctrine, while not before the court in Filartiga,
is likely to be raised in other suits against government officials
under section 1350.
The classic statement of the Act of State doctrine is found in
Underhill v. H ernandez: 250
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 250a

In essence, the doctrine aids both federal and state courts in
determining under what circumstances they may properly adjudicate the validity of foreign acts of state. As the United States
Supreme Court noted in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 251
the seminal case on the Act of State doctrine as currently applied,
the doctrine is not compelled either by "the inherent nature of
sovereign authority" or by principles of international law .252
Rather, the doctrine has constitutional underpinnings. "It arises
out of the basic relationships between branches of government in
a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of
dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of
decisions in the area of international relations." 253 The genesis of
and justification for the Act of State doctrine is important because
it gives the courts flexibility in deciding when exercise of judicial
power is appropriate in reviewing acts of foreign states. The court
recognized this flexibility in Sabbatino when it suggested a
249. Id. at 889-90 (citations omitted).
250. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
250a. Id. at 252.
251. 376 u.s. 398 (1964).
252. Id. at 421.
253. Id. at 423.
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number of considerations to be balanced in evaluating whether the
doctrine should be applied. Chief among these considerations are
the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular
area of international law, and the extent to which judicial involvement would interfere with the executive's conduct of foreign relations.254
Application of both these factors in section 1350 suits should
lead to the conclusion that the Act of State doctrine is not a bar to
the exercise of judicial power. First, the plaintiff in section 1350
suits must establish that the tort violates the law of nations. As
the court's opinion in Fi'lartiga indicates, 255 the task of showing
that an international norm can properly be labeled a "law of nations" is a difficult one. That is, plaintiff must show a substantial
consensus, supported by at least some codification, that the norm
is to be treated as a binding rule of law. Thus the very test for
establishing subject matter jurisdiction under section 1350
similarly establishes one of the chief factors involved in the Act of
State analysis. The second factor also would have been satisfied in
Filartiga. The United States State Department has indicated that
the likelihood of conflict between the executive and judicial
branches is reduced when the court is called upon to apply principles of international law that have been widely accepted by the
international community. 256 Where clear violations of human rights
are alleged, it is likely that, in light of the increasing concern for
human rights expressed by recent administrations, 257 inter-branch
friction is averted by courts interpreting the Act of State doctrine
narrowly rather than broadly. One of the interesting aspects of
any increased use of section 1350 as a basis for subject matter
jurisdiction over violations of human rights after Filartiga may be
the position taken with regard to Act of State challenges to sec254. Id. at 428. The court proceeds to explain that:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the
application of an agreed principle . . . rather than on the sensitive task of
establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice. Id.
255. Filartiga v. Pei\a-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881.
256. Appendix 1 to the opinion of the court in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 709-11 (1976).
257. See remarks of President Carter reported in 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
2161-65 (July 3, 1978).
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tion .1350 suits by the Reagan administration. Since courts traditionally seek a statement from the State Department when faced
with Act of State questions, the administration's conception of the
relatively limited role to be played by the United States in international human rights issues 258 may be reflected in State Department responses more supportive of judicial deference to the valic!ity of sovereign acts by foreign governments.
The availability of the Act of State doctrine to limit judicial
inquiry into the acts of foreign officials may pose a problem for
plaintiffs in section 1350 suits similar to that posed by the assertion of sovereign immunity by defendants. 259 In order for a violation of international law to occur, a state must be in some way implicated in the violation. However, if the defendant commits the
section 1350 tort in his official capacity as an officer of the state, in
some cases the Act of State doctrine will bar the suit. As commentators on the Filartiga decision have pointed out, 260 this dilemma is
a superficial one. The court in Filartiga noted briefly that the
dilemma is resolved by distinguishing the level of authorization required to characterize the violation as one implicating the state as
well as the individual actor for the purpose of triggering the application of international law, from the kind of authorization that
would raise the violation to an act of state. 261 This resolution has a
parallel in United States domestic law in the "under color of state
law" language of 42 U.S.C. sections 1981-83 as distinct from state
action itself. 262
e.

Choice of Law

Perhaps the most immediate question left open by Filartiga is
the choice of law to be applied by the lower court in deciding the
merits of the case. The question is particularly difficult because of
the language employed in section 1350. One element of that section requires a cause of action in tort only. If the court were to
258. See Reagan interview reported in 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 234-368 (March 9,
1981).
259. See pp. 203-04 supra.
260. Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 108
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Blum & Steinhardt].
261. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 889-90. The exact language of the court is
quoted in the introductory paragraph to this act of state discussion at p. 205 supra.
262. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 260 at 110 n.240.
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focus on the fact that a tort action is presented, it might be likely
to apply traditional choice of law rules and thus would choose the
law of the situs or of any place where sufficient contacts were
established. 263 In essence, a section 1350 claim would be treated
like any other tort claim. But section 1350 is also directed against
"violations of the law of nations" .26aa Focus on this element would
suggest that international law is to be applied.
There are inhere.n t problems in applying either state or international law as the rule of decision. The laws of the state where
the violation occurred may not favor a tort action based on the
underlying facts, particularly where the suit is against a government official. The other alternative, using general international
law as the rule of decision, is problematic because international
law is not yet sufficiently detailed and refined to provide the
various elements of the cause of action or to identify clearly the
defenses that might be available to the defendant. The federal
court would be in the position of creating general federal common
law supposedly grounded in international law. To the extent that
other nations are suspicious of the treatment an alien will receive
in the American courts or simply hostile to Western legal traditions and principles, a federal court fashioning rules of decision
based on international law could inadvertently create international tension. International comity might suffer, with the
foreseeable result that Americans find themselves tried abroad on
the basis of an understanding of international law totally foreign
to the Western legal mind. 264
The court was not called upon to decide the choice of law
issue in Fi"lartiga. It did comment on the problem, however. First,
in responding to Pefia's argument that the customary law of nations is not self-executing and thus cannot provide the rule of decision, the court said:
263. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws employs a test which balances such factors as the situs of the injury, the predominant situs of the parties and the domicile of the
parties in determining the law to be applied in tort actions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LA ws § 145 (1971). This choice of law rule represents a change from that articulated in
the first Restatement which simply applied a "situs of the injury" test. RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 377-83 (1934).
263a. 28 U .S.C. § 1350 (1976).
264. For a more detailed discussion of the choice of law problems presented by § 1350
see Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 260, at 97-103 (1981).
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[H]e confuses the question of federal jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute, which requires consideration of the law of nations, with the issue of the choice of law to be applied .... The
two issues are distinct. Our holding on subject matter jurisdiction decides only whether Congress intended to confer judicial
power, and whether it was authorized to do so by Article III. The
choice of law inquiry is a much broader one, primarily concerned
with fairness; consequently, it looks to wholly different considerations. 265

The court clearly indicated that the "violation of the law of nations"
language of section 1350 is jurisdictional only and does not require the application of a particular substantive law. Indeed, the
court recognized that any one of three sources might be chosen:
the law of the forum, the law of the situs, or the law of nations. 266
The court gave particular attention to the effect of choosing the
law of Paraguay. This subject deserved the additional attention
because of the potential conflict between applying the law of a particular foreign state and the court's resolution of the constitutionality of the federal courts applying the law of nations under article III. The court resolved the conflict by distinguishing between
the jurisdictional question and the application of a particular
source of law to the merits. Once it is determined that jurisdiction
is established under section 1350, that is, that the tort alleged
violates the law of nations, the case properly "arises under" the
laws of the United States for the purposes of article III. A subsequent decision to use foreign law, although resulting in a cause of
action not "created" by a law of the United States, does not
retroactively deprive the district court of jurisdiction. 267

f.

Other Violations Under the Act

In Filartiga, official torture was held to violate the law of nations.2678 The court was not called upon to and did not indicate
what other kinds of conduct might violate the law of nations and
thus fall within the scope of section 1350. However, the court
recognized that the law of nations is continually evolving and that
265. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
266. Id.
267. Id. at n. 25.
267a. Id. at 884.
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the types of violations encompassed by section 1350 "will be a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration." 268
In reaching its conclusion that torture violated the law of nations, the court elucidated what is required to raise a general
standard of conduct to a "law of nations". Both the language used
by the court and the text of the international sources it cited suggest the parameters of what may be required to bring other types
of conduct under the rubric of the "law of nations". First, "[i]t is only
where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong
is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express
international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes
an international law violation within the meaning of the statute." 269
Thus, a plaintiff suing under the act must be able to point to international agreements. These agreements must be multilateral,
rather than bilateral. Although the above quotation does not require it, the court elsewhere in its opinion indicated that the violation need not be recognized by every nation on earth. It is sufficient that the standard expressed represent the "general assent of
civilized nations." 210 Thus, as the court pointed out, expropriation
of foreign-owned property does not rise to the level required by
section 1350. 271 Although expropriation without adequate compensation is recognized by many Western nations as a violation of international law, it is not so recognized by socialist nations or by
many developing nations, and thus does not command sufficient international recognition to be labeled a law of nations. Although
not expressed directly in either the statute or the opinion of the
court, it is probable that section 1350 requires international
agreements that are mandatory rather than recommendatory in
nature. This requirement is supported by the types of international accords the court relied upon in concluding that torture
violated the law of nations. The relevant sections of the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected
268. Id. at 885.
269. Id. at 888.
270. Id. at 881. The court's use and discussion of the term "general assent of nations"
suggests not only a substantial majority of nations but, within that majority, inclusion of nations representing the widely varied political, economic and social values that characterize
modern international society.
271. 630 F.2d at 881. See also, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
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to Torture, the American Convention of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, employ mandatory language in prohibiting torture. 272
The mandatory nature of such provisions stands in contrast to
pronouncements in international instruments which speak of
general obligations on the part of states or simply recommend
standards of conduct to states. 273
Applying the requirement of express international agreements, mandatory in nature, and generally consented to by nations, it would appear that only prohibitions against genocide and
slavery, in addition to prohibitions against torture, rise to the
level required by section 1350. Both genocide and slavery are prohibited by numerous international accords similar to those prohibiting torture. 274 Both are rejected by the principles and purposes of the United Nations. 275
Perhaps the most significant feature of the court's decision in
Filartiga .is the recognition that international law is dynamic
rather than static and that, therefore the coverage of section 1350
will not be static. "It is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today ." 276 In light of the activity of
the General Assembly and other international organizations
directed toward the "progressive development of international
law", the scope of international concern, and eventually of interna272. U.N. CHARTER. art. 55, 59 Stat. 1033 (1945); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 5, 30 U.N. GAOR, Annexes 535-41, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948); Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034
(1975); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5, OAS Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, OAS
Off. Rec. OEA/Ser 4 v/11 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 220 (xxi)A, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Council of Europe, European Treaty Series No. 5 (1968), 213 U.N.T.S. 211.
273. See e.g., Security Council resolutions "inviting" states to influence South Africa to
end apartheid. S.C. Res. 190, 19 SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/19/Rev. 1, at 12-13 (1964).
274. Genocide: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 272, art. 2; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
Slavery: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 272, art. 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 272, arts. 6, 7.
275. U.N. CHARTER; art. 1, para. 2 (to develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of ... self-determination of peoples); art. 1, para. 3.
276. Filartiga v. Pei'ia-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881.
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tional law, is likely to expand continuously and perhaps exponentially. Where human rights are involved, the court in Filartiga has
paved the way for those expanded rights to be redressed in the
federal courts of the United States.
2.

IIT v. CORNFELD

Federal Courts' Exercise of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over
Transnational Security Dealings - Defining the Scope of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Historical Interpretation of
the Securities Exchange Act - Balancing United States and
Foreign Interests
Over the last decade, the Second Circuit has decided a
number of important cases 277 involving the extraterritorial reach
of the antifraud provision, Rule lOb-5 278 , promulgated under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 279 In one of the
most complex Survey-year cases, ITT v. Cornfeld, 280 the court further articulated the guidelines to be used in determining when
federal courts may assert subject matter jurisdiction over
transnational security dealings.
The 1934 Act does not contain any provision defining its extraterritorial reach, and the legislative history of the act is devoid
of any consideration of the question, probably because the current
nature and extent of transnational securities dealings was not
foreseen or contemplated by the Congress in 1934. Therefore, in
determining the appropriate tests for exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over alleged Rule lOb-5 violations involving parties or
transactions outside the United States, federal courts turned to
two principles of state jurisdiction set out in the Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 281
First is the "subjective territorial" or "conduct" principle which
founds jurisdiction upon conduct within the state's territory. 282
277. Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC , 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1009 (1978); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F .2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equipment v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
278. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1980).
279. 15 U.S.§§ 78a-78hh (1976).
280. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
282. Id. at§ 17:
Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Conduct, Thing, Status, or Other
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Second is the "objective territorial" or "effects" principle which
bases jurisdiction upon conduct outside a state causing an effect
within the state if:
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as
constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states
that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of
activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable
result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not
inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized
by states that have reasonably developed legal systems. 283

The two principles support jurisdiction independently: that is, if
either the subjective principle (conduct) or the objective principle
(effects) applies, jurisdiction may properly be exercised. Both
bases have been relied upon by the Second Circuit in pre-Cornfeld
cases to give extraterritorial reach to Rule lOb-5 and section lO(b)
of the 1934 Act.
a.

Case Law Prior to Cornfeld

The "effects" (objective territorial) principle was first ·relied
on to support jurisdiction over the subject matter of a lOb-5 suit in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. 284 In Schoenbaum the court held that
Rule lOb-5 applies to transactions involving stock registered and
listed on a national stock exchange which take place outside the
United States, if such transactions are harmful to the interests of
American investors. 285 A later opinion by the Second Circuit 286 sugInterest within Territory
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct
outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
283. Id. at § 18.
284. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
285. 405 F.2d at 208. The language of the case indicating an "effects" analysis was
drawn from the Supreme Court's opinion in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the actor] had been present at the [time of] the effect ....
286. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2nd Cir.
1972).
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gested that the holding in Schoenbaum should not be expansively
applied. In Leasco v. Maxwell, the court refused to base jurisdiction solely on the fact that the injured party was an American corporation. The court was doubtful that "Congress meant to impose
rules governing conduct throughout the world in every instance
where an American company bought or sold a security ." 287 Leas co
severely weakened the authority of, but did not overrule, Schoenbaum. The only other case in which the "effects" principle provided the exclusive jurisdictional ground is Des Brisay v. Goldfield
Corp., 288 in which the court focused on the fact that the securities
involved were listed on a national exchange and the American
market was harmed. 289
Employment of the "effects" principle as a basis for subject
matter jurisdiction is problematic due in large part to the potential foreign relations implications of an expansive ~onception of
"effects." This is particularly true in light of the incidence of
multimillion dollar international transactions which are bound to
have significant effects in a number of nations. Overuse of the "effects" principle might result in American corporations being forced to defend suits throughout the world should other nations, taking offense at intrusions in their economic affairs by federal
courts, decide to employ a similar basis for the jurisdiction of their
courts. As Chief Justice Burger recognized in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 290 :
[T]he expansion of American business and industry will hardly
be encouraged if ... we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts ....
We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our own terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts.

Perhaps it is these effects of the objective principle that have led
most courts ruling on the extraterritorial reach of Rule lOb-5 and
287. 468 F.2d at 1334. See also Continental Grain Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592
F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
288. 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
289. 549 F.2d at 136. It is significant to note that only one of the plaintiffs in Des Brisay
was American.
290. 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). See also, Sandberg, The Extraterritorial Reach of American
Economic Regulation: The Case of Securities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315, 326 (1976).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss1/5

56

Youngblood: 1980 Survey

1980]

1980 Survey

215

section lO(b) to employ the "conduct" principle wherever possible
as a basis of jurisdiction.
The "conduct" or "subjective" territorial principle supports
subject matter jurisdiction over a transnational security transaction if some conduct in relation to that dealing takes place
within the Untied States. 291 The cases prior to Cornfeld applying
the "conduct" test can best be understood by differentiating
among three kinds of fact patterns in which it is employed: sales of
securities to American residents in the United States, resulting
from the conduct of foreigners in the United States; sales of
securities to foreigners outside the United States; and sales of
securities to Americans residing abroad. 292
The Second Circuit in Leasco articulated what has been a
uniform view of federal courts confronting the first factual situation of a resident American injured by the conduct of a foreigner
in the United States:
[W]e must ask ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about
the point, it would not have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States and fraudulently
induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad- a purpose
which its words can fairly be held to embrace. 293

The second kind of factual pattern raising the question of the
extraterritorial reach of Rule lOb-5 and section lOb involves conduct within the United States which causes loss to foreigners.
Although a number of federal courts have dealt with this type of
case, 294 the Second Circuit has given the most comprehensive con291. RESTATEMENT at§ 17 (1965).
292. See, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 u.s. 1018 (1975).
293. 468 F.2d at 1337. See also, Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1973); Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Fla. 1973). The court indicated in Leasco
that conduct by a foreigner in the United States harming another foreigner might not support the exercise of jurisdiction: "The case is quite different from another hypothetical we
posed at argument, namely, where a German and a Japanese businessman met in New York
for convenience, and the latter fraudulently induced the former to make purchases of
Japanese securities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange." 468 F ..2d at 1338.
294. Continental Grain Pty. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); United States v. Cook, 573
F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d
591 (3d Cir. 1976); SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 475 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v.
Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
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sideration to the question. 295 In IIT v. Vencap, the court concluded
that Congress had not "intended to allow the United States to be
used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for
export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners." 296 The
court held, however, that where the victim of a fraudulent security
dealing is a foreigner, jurisdiction can only be exercised where the
conduct within the United States is the perpetration of the
fradulent act, not "mere preparatory activities or the failure to
prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in foreign countries .... " 297
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 298 the court reiterated this
test for establishing jurisdiction where foreigners are victimized
by securities fraud, but indicated that a different test is employed
to determine the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction where the
victims are Americans residing abroad. "While merely
preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners
located abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to
Americans so resident." 299 In order to exercise jurisdiction over
section lOb and Rule lOb-5 suits arising from injury to Americans
residing abroad, it is only necessary that the conduct within the
United States materially contribute to the injury. 300
Thus, prior to Cornfeld, the "conduct" test for the extraterritorial reach of the securities laws was a tripartite examination.
Cornfeld eroded the distinction between two factual situations
previously significant to the courts.

b.

The Cornfeld Decision

Although the factual history of Cornfeld is complex, a general
outline of the parties and major transactions involved in the suit is
required to understand fully the legal conclusions reached by the
court. The plaintiff is IIT, an international investment trust, which
was organized under the laws of Luxembourg. IIT was controlled
295.
519 F.2d
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
974 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d at 1017.
Id. at 1018.
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 992.
Id. at 993.
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and managed by IIT Management Company, S.A., a Luxembourg
corporation, which was controlled by Investors Overseas Services,
Ltd. (IOS), incorporated in Canada. The latter two companies were
controlled by Bernard Cornfeld and were operated out of Switzerland. The suit arose out of three allegedly fraudulent acquisitions
by IIT of securities issued by companies controlled by an American, John M. King. First, IIT acquired debentures, issued in
Europe, of a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of l<ing Resources
Company (KRC), a publicly owned Maine corporation. Second, IIT
purchased King Resources Company common stock in the United
States over-the-counter market. This purchase was made through
the brokerage services of the Arthur Lipper Corporation. Third,
IIT directly purchased a convertable note from The Colorado Corporation (TCC), which was privately owned by King. The
gravamen of the complaint was that these acquisitions were part
of a conspiracy to defraud IIT by those in control of IOS, Lipper
and the King companies. 301
Considering the jurisdictional question as to whether Rule
10b-5's extraterritorial reach encompassed these transactions, the
district court first applied the "effects" or "objective territorial
principle" and rejected that basis for jurisdiction. 302 The court
noted that "an unparticularized deleterious effect on the American
economy resulting from the IOS collapse- i.e., a damaged ability
to attract offshore investment funds -is not sufficient." 303 The
court also stated that a de minimus number of American citizen
shareholders would not create a jurisdictionally sufficient effect in
the United States. 304 The Second Circuit agreed that the effects
within the United States were not sufficient to support the assertion of jurisdiction. 305
The district court then turned to the "subjective territorial
principle" and focused on whether there was sufficient conduct
within the United States to support jurisdiction. The court began
with the principle that "in the context of a suit by a foreign plaintiff ... the jurisdictional significance of the defendants' allegedly
301.
302.
998-99).
303.
304.
305.

IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1980).
IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing Bersch, 519 F.2d at
Id.
Id.
IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 917.
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domestic fraudulent acts must be considered in the context of the
plaintiffs' theory of the case." 306 Plaintiffs' theory, according to the
court, was based upon alleged fraud upon foreign fundholders by
foreign management, aided and abetted by actors within the
United States (principally John M. King). The acts of the "aiders
and abettors" were "preparatory or secondary" to the fraud
perpetrated by foreign actors.
When the scheme finds its genesis abroad, however, with a
group of foreign managers of a foreign investment trust
violating what would appear to be their fiduciary duties to their
fundholders, and the foreign managers merely enlist the aid of
American aiders and abettors, then the prospect of applying
federal law to the transactions is drastically changed. 307

Thus, having characterized the theory of the case as one primarily
involving a fraud perpetrated by foreign managers of IIT who
simply enlisted the aid of Americans, the district court rejected
conduct within the United States as a basis for jurisdiction. 308
The Second Circuit disagreed. The district court's
characterization of defendants as "aiders and ab bettors", while a
fair description of the role of the accountant, the underwriter, and
Lipper, was not an accurate description of members of the King
complex and other defendants, who, plaintiffs claimed, were
perpetrators of the fraud. Thus, the aiding and abetting related to
a deception originating in the United States. According to the
court, "[a]n actual participant in a fraud is no less a principal
because someone else originated the plan." 309
The court did not find it difficult to find a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over IIT's purchase of KRC's common stock
and the TCC convertable note, as both were essentially domestic
transactions. 310 In fact, the only foreign element in these transactions was the transmission of orders from outside the United
States by foreign purchasers. A more difficult question was
presented by the debentures of the Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of KRC. The debentures were not registered under the
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. at 220.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 226.
IIT v."Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 918.
Id.
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1934 Act and were purchased in the European market rather than
in the United States.
The court began its analysis of the debenture transaction by
restating its conclusion in Bersch that the anti-fraud provisions of
the Securities Act "[d]o not apply to losses from sales of securities
to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable
failures to act) within the United States directly caused such
losses." 311 The facts in Cornfeld were then distinguished from
those in Bersch on three principal grounds. First, the fact that
KRC was a domestic corporation and the fact that the foreign subsidiary through which the debentures were sold was merely a
shell for KRC weighed heavily in the court's analysis. 312 Bersch involved the stock of a Canadian corporation. The nationality of the
issuer was significant to the court because "Congress would have
been considerably more interested in assuring against the
fraudulent issuance of s~curities constituting obligations of
American rather than purely foreign business." 313 Second, the
court emphasized that the European debenture offering was an integral part of an overall financing scheme for KRC centered in the
United States, 314 whereas in Bersch the primary offering was exclusively in Europe and the secondary offering was exclusively in
Canada. 315 Finally, the court emphasized that the prospectus for
the European debenture offering in Cornfeld had been wholly
prepared in the United States and concluded that "[d]etermination
whether American activities 'directly' caused losses to foreigners
depends not only on how much was done in the United States but
also on how much (here how little) was done abroad." 316
The nature of the court's analysis of the defendants' conduct
suggests an erosion, or at least a blurring, of the distinction
previously drawn by the Second Circuit between suits in which
foreigners suffered as a result of fraudulent securities dealings
(requiring an analysis of whether domestic activity directly caused
311. Id. at 919.
312. Id. The court pointed out that the Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of KRC was involved in the debenture sale only for tax purposes. The subsidiary had no operating assets
and therefore the debentures were guaranteed by, and convertible into the common stock
of, the parent company, KRC. Id. at 919-20.
313. Id. at 920.
314. Id.
315. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 979-80.
316. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920-21.
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the loss) and suits in which nonresident Americans are injured by
fraudulent securities dealings (requiring that acts of material importance in the United States significantly contribute to the loss).
The court directed its attention to characterizing the Euromarket
debenture transaction as "essentially American" 317 instead of focusing on whether the activities within the United States were "merely
preparatory" rather than directly causal as required by Bersch
and Vencap. In this sense, the court's analysis in Cornfeld is more
closely akin to the standard previously articulated for use in suits
involving Americans residing abroad. That standard requires a
weighing of the conduct within the United States relative to
foreign conduct and a determination of the materiality of the
domestic activity to the fraudulent scheme. If the Second Circuit
continues to apply the kind of analysis employed in Cornfeld to
Rule lOb-5 and section lOb suits causing loss to foreigners, the different treatment accorded foreigners and Americans residing
abroad by the tripartite test of Bersch will be eliminated.
Outlining the parameters of the extraterritorial reach of
United States securities laws requires a balancing of a number of
interests. Defining the reach of federal court jurisdiction to include suits arising out of any transaction having an effect on the
American market or suits arising from some conduct in the United
States may needlessly intrude in the affairs of other nations with
consequent harm to the foreign commercial and diplomatic relations of the United States. Other nations, particularly industrialized nations, are as likely as the United States to be concerned
with deterring fraudulent transnational securities dealings.
Where a particular fraudulent scheme is essentially centered in
another nation, federal courts are wise to refuse jurisdiction, not
only as a matter of deference to the judicial function in other nations, but also to diminish the likelihood that other nations will expand the jurisdiction of their courts over fraudulent transactions
which are essentially American.
yet, as dangerous as . broad exercise of jurisdiction in
transnational securities dealings would be, a narrowly defined extraterritorial reach would fail to serve both the domestic and international interests of the United States. If federal courts are too
reticent to exercise jurisdiction, the United States might become,

a

317. Id. at 920.
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in the words of one federal court, a "'Barbary Coast' ... harboring
international securities 'pirates'. " 318 Additionally, a failure of the
United States to open its courts to securities fraud suits involving
activity in the United States might "induce reciprocal responses
on the part of other nations" to "decline to act against individuals
and corporations seeking to transport securities fraud to the
United States." 319
By carefully analyzing whether international transactions are
"essentially American" in origin and direction, the court in Cornfeld avoided the rigid tricotomy established by Bersch and struck
the balance between American and foreign interests in a sensible
and principled manner.
3.

RUGGIERO V. COMPANIE PERVANA DE VAPORES

Discussion of Jury Trials in Jones Act Cases-Impact of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 on the Right to a Jury
Trial-The Disallowance of Jury Trials in Jones Act Cases Does
Not Violate the Seventh Amendment
In recent decisions, federal district courts have reached conflicting conclusions in resolving the question whether a United
States plaintiff suing a foreign government-owned corporation is
entitled to a jury trial. Most recently, the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York held in consolidated Jones Act cases
that plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. 320
The cases are personal injury suits brought under the Jones
Act 321 by longshoremen. Defendant in each case is a shipping company wholly owned by a foreign government. Each plaintiff
demanded a jury trial; each defendant moved to strike such demand. Defendants' motions were based on the assertion that a
jury trial is banned by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA). 322 Plaintiffs contended that the Immunities Act does
not bar jury trials and that if it does, the act is unconstitutional

318. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
319. Id.
320. Ruggiero v. Companie Pervana De Vapores "Inca Capac Yupunqui," 498 F. Supp.
10 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
321. 33 u.s.c. § 905(b) (1976).
322. 28 u.s.c. § 1330 (1976).
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under the seventh amendment. 323 The district court granted defendants' motions to strike.
The issue before the court involved the proper construction of
28 U .S.C. section 1332(a)(2) in light of the FSIA. The FSIA amended section 1332(a)(2) by deleting reference to "foreign states." The
section, as amended, provides jurisdiction over suits involving
"citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." 324 In
addition to amending section 1332(a)(2), the FSIA added to title 28
three new sections dealing with jurisdiction over "foreign states."
Section 1330(a) gives the district courts original jurisdiction over
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as to any claim
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.
Section 1332(a)(4) provides jurisdiction over suits between a
foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of a state or different states.
Section 1603 defines "foreign states" for the purposes of both section 1330(a) and section 1332(a)(4). 325
The court concluded that the effect of the FSIA revisions was
to eliminate jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(2) in suits between
American citizen plaintiffs and foreign state defendants. 326 The only jurisdictional base available to plaintiffs is section 1330(a),
which does not provide a right to trial by jury. 327 Any other conclusion, according to the court, would be contrary to congressional intent.328 Congress sought to promote uniformity between suits

323. Because the constitutionality of the Immunities Act was put in issue the Attorney
General was given notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a). The Attorney General chose not to
intervene in the case. Ruggiero, 498 F. Supp. at 11.
324. Prior to enactment of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) read:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds ... $10,000 ... and is between ... citizens of a
State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof...."
325. Section 1603(b) of title 28 defines "foreign state" to include:
"any entity ... which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise ... a majority of whose shares ... is owned by a foreign state ... [and] which is neither a
citizen of a State of the United States ... nor created under the laws of any third
country."
All defendants in Ruggiero are foreign states within this definition. 498 F. Supp. at 12.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. The court quoted a House Report which stated that "[s]ince jurisdiction in actions against foreign states is comprehensively treated by the new section 1330, a similar
jurisdictional basis under section 1332 becomes superfluous." H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong.
2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS, 6604, 6631.
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against the United States Government in which jury trials are
banned 329 and suits against foreign governments. 330
The court found further evidence of congressional intent in
the provision for removal jurisdiction under the FSIA. 28 U .S.C.
section 1441(d), added by the FSIA, allows a foreign state to
remove to federal district court any civil action brought against it
in a state court. The section specifically states: "Upon removal the
action shall be tried by the court without jury ." 331 Allowing plaintiffs a jury trial in a suit originally brought in federal court while
denying such a trial in identical suits removed from state courts
would "thwart Congressional intent to promote uniformity in dealing with cases against foreign states." 332
Having decided that plaintiffs were barred from a jury trial,
the court faced the constitutional issue of whether such a bar
denied the -eonstitutional right to a jury trial protected by the
seventh amendment, and held that Congress could constitutionally
bar such trials. The court noted that, at the time of enactment of
the seventh amendment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
would have barred plaintiffs' suits. 333 Therefore, "there appears [to
be] no basis for concluding that they would have been considered
'suits at common law' within the meaning of the seventh amendment."334 There was, therefore, no right to a jury trial in such suits
to be affected by the FSIA. 335
At least two federal district courts considering the same
jurisdictional question that confronted the court in Ruggiero
reached a conflicting result. In Icenogle v. Olympic Airways
S.A., 336 the court held that a government-owned corporation may
be considered a "citizen of a foreign state" (section 1332(a)(2)) as
329. 28 u.s.c. § 2402 (1976).
330. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
Ao. NEWS 6611-12; Ruggiero, 498 F. Supp. at 13.
331. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). The question of whether a plaintiff has a statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial when an action commenced in state court against a foreign state is
removed to federal court pursuant to§ 1441(d) was presented in Herman v. El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd., 502 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court held plaintiff had no such
statutory or constitutional right. Id. at 280.
332. 498 F. Supp. at 13.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979).
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well as a "foreign state" (section 1332(a)(4)). Therefore, jurisdiction
could be obtained under section 1332(a)(2) in suits between
American citizens and government-owned foreign corporations.
The court recognized that a different result would obtain if the
case were removed from state court pursuant to section 1441(d),
but reasoned that the absence of the "commanding language"
against jury trials in section 1332(a)(2) justified the different treatment.3368 Finally, the court reasoned that its holding would result
in similar treatment of foreign government corporations and
United States government-owned corporations. 336b
In Rex v. Gia. Pervana De Vapores S.A., 337 the court followed
the Icenogle holding and stated in dicta that since the suit
presented a traditional tort question, any attempt by Congress to
deprive plaintiff of a jury trial would be unconstitutional. 3378 A constitutional issue was avoided by a holding that jurisdiction under
section 1332(a)(2) was not barred. 337b
The decisions in both Ruggiero and Rex were certified to the
Court of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits, respectively,
for immediate interlocutory appeal. 338 Both circuit courts gave
leave for the appeals. 339
Characterizing the district court's opinion in Ruggiero as
"well-considered," the Second Circuit affirmed. 340 Much of the appellate court's opinion simply reiterates the statutory analysis
undertaken by the lower court. In two respects, however, the
opinion is valuable as an amplification of the reasoning behind the
lower court's holding. First, the Second Circuit more clearly identified the intent of Congress in revising, through the FSIA, the
jursidictional basis for suit against foreign states and entities in
336a. Id. at 39.
336b. Id. at 41.
337. 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
337a. Id. at 465.
337b. Id. at 466.
338. 498 F. Supp. at 13-14, 493 F. Supp. at 469.
339. Ruggiero v. Compania Pervana de Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1981). As of
this writing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not rendered an opinion in Rex. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is considering the same question on appeal from
Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980) and Williams v. Shipping
Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980).
340. The United States intervened on appeal, by authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), and
submitted a brief in support of the district court's resolution of the case. 639 F.2d at 873.
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federal courts. 341 After reviewing House and Senate Reports on
the proposed FSIA 342 the court concluded:
The reports thus confirm what is patent from the statutory
language - Congress wished to provide a single vehicle for actions against foreign states or entities controlled by them, to wit,
§ 1330 and § 1441(d), its equivalent on removal, and to bar jury
trial in each. In return for conferring upon plaintiffs this clear
basis of jurisdiction in actions against foreign states (even in
suits for $10,000 or less), codifying the restrictive principle of
sovereign immunity and vesting its determination in the courts,
§§ 1602-05, providing a feasible method of service of process, §
1608, and authorizing execution of a judgment upon property of a
foreign state, § 1610, Congress intended that the foreign state,
defined broadly in § 1603, was not to be subjected to jury
trial- a form of trial alien to most of them in civil cases and from
which the United States, in granting consent to suit, has generally exempted itself. 343

Second, the Second Circuit gave considerably more attention
than the district court did to the plaintiffs' assertion that deprivation of a jury trial in these suits would violate the seventh amendment.344 The court noted that the function of the seventh amendment was to preserve rather than to create a right to a jury trial.
"[I]f the action is a common law suit or the particular issues arise
in a common law suit, but no right of jury trial existed under the
common law of England as to that type of action, then there is no
right to jury trial by virtue of the Seventh Amendment." 345 Plaintiffs could not have sued defendants at common law in 1791 and
thus could not have had a right to jury trial. The court then considered the wisdom of straining the definition of "suits at common
law" 346 to recognize a constitutional right to a jury in these suits,
341. 639 F .2d at 876-878.
342. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
Ao. NEWS 6604; S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
343. 639 F.2d at 878.
344. Id. at 878-881.
345. Id. at 879 (quoting 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE , 38.-08(5] (2d ed. 1976)). See also,
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372
(1943); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S . 530 (1962).
346. Plaintiffs' reply brief cited an article in which the author argued that in 1791 it
was possible to sue the Crown in a common law action in which there was a trial by jury:
Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh Amendment Right, 58 TEX. L. REV. 549 (1980). The court summarizes Professor Kirst's argument at
639 F .2d at 880 n.10.

Published by SURFACE, 1980

67

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1980], Art. 5

226

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 8:159

and concluded that "there are sufficient reasons why newly
authorized suits against foreign sovereigns ... are sui generis and
should not be deemed to be within the scope of the Seventh
Amendment's preservation of a jury trial." 347 These reasons relate
to the foreign relations interests of the United States. Congress
could legitimately be concerned that a withdrawal of sovereign immunity from foreign states in certain kinds of actions would interfere with the international relations of the United States
"unless such States were accorded protection similar to what [the
United States] had given itself." 348
If the other courts of appeals considering the proper construction of the FSIA revisions reach a contrary result to that reached
by the Second Circuit in Ruggiero, Supreme Court review of the
question is likely. Given the clear language of the statutes involved, and the unequivocal nature of the legislative history behind
the FSIA, the Second Circuit's analysis should prevail. As that
court stated in Ruggiero,
The courts must learn to accept that, in place of the familiar
dichotomy of federal question and diversity jurisdiction, the Immunities Act has created a tripartite division- federal question
cases, diversity cases and actions against foreign states. If a case
falls within the third division, there is to be no jury trial even if
it might also come within one of the other two. 349
347. 639 F.2d at 881.
348. Id. at 880.
Foreign countries can hardly object to the United States' subjecting them to trial
by a judge in commercial cases when the United States itself is subject to the same
sort of trial in its own courts and in theirs. Subjection to trial by jury, especially
with the restraints on review of jury findings also imposed by the Seventh Amendment, would be a different matter, especially since the great majority of countries
do not use a civil jury.
Id.

349. Id. at 876.
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